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I. INTRODUCTION
After years of legal maneuvering and courtroom skirmishes, the lines in the war between 
copyright holders and online copyright infringers have been clearly drawn.  This conflict, which 
is poised to erupt in courts across the country, began decades ago with the birth of the Internet, 
which gave rise to a previously unparalleled opportunity for the dissemination, sharing, and 
enjoyment of every conceivable form of human expression.  In addition to the benefits it has 
provided, the Internet also has given rise to copyright infringement on a global scale through the 
unauthorized posting and sharing of digital files.  After years of unsuccessfully battling Internet 
service providers (ISPs) and file sharing network software distributors, such as Napster and 
KaZaA, the war against digital copyright infringement may end soon, now that copyright holders 
are finally taking action directly against the actual infringers.  To bring such actions against 
individual infringers, copyright holders must serve subpoenas on the ISPs pursuant to the Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act1 [hereinafter DMCA] to obtain the infringers’ subscriber information.  
Before the real conflict concerning copyright infringement can be fought in the courts or over 
settlement tables, various issues with the intermediate subpoena process must be resolved.  First, 
does the subpoena authority granted by the DMCA put too much power into the hands of 
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2copyright owners?  And even more importantly, does this subpoena power strip from alleged 
infringers any defense that they may have against its abuse?  Unless an appropriate balance can 
be reached with respect to the authority granted by the DMCA’s subpoena provision, the war 
against copyright infringement will be won at the expense of service providers and the 
Constitutional rights of alleged infringers.
The goal of this Article is to demonstrate that the DMCA subpoena provision neither aids 
those attempting to enforce copyrights nor sufficiently protects the interests of Internet users.  A 
recent decision by the DC Court of Appeals stripped copyright holders of the use of the DMCA 
subpoena in situations where the offender’s ISP acts merely as a conduit for the transmission of 
infringing material, which encompasses the most pervasive and egregious form of infringement:  
unauthorized sharing of copyrighted material via peer-to-peer (P2P) networks, such as KaZaA.2
Thus, the DMCA subpoena power is unavailable to copyright holders when it is most needed.  
This situation must be remedied.
At the same time, and even more importantly, additional statutory safeguards protecting 
the interests of ISPs and the rights of alleged copyright infringers must be built into the subpoena 
provision, which may be accomplished without sacrificing or significantly impeding copyright 
owners’ ability to enforce their copyrights.  At best, the DMCA subpoena provision, in its 
current form, completely undermines alleged infringers’ Fifth Amendment due process rights 
and unfairly places the likely immense burden of challenging and responding to subpoenas on 
ISPs.  At worst, the provision is susceptible to mistakes and abuse by those who would use it for 
purposes other than copyright enforcement.  The inclusion of certain requirements, such as 
requiring the provision of notice to alleged infringers before their subscriber information is 
2
 Recording Indus. Ass’n of America v. Verizon Internet Servs., Inc., 351 F.3d 1229 (D.C. Cir. 2003) [hereinafter 
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3released, would not unduly burden copyright holders or hinder the enforcement process, but 
would protect against mistakes and abuse.
Part II of this Article will briefly paint a picture of the events leading up to the copyright 
holders’ utilization of the DMCA subpoena power.  Next, Part III will give an overview of the 
DMCA, focusing primarily on the subpoena provision and Congress’s intent regarding that 
subsection.  Part IV will then discuss the specific practical and Constitutional problems that have 
been raised with respect to the DMCA subpoena power and how the courts have addressed them.  
Finally, Part V will propose various solutions to the more serious problems and conclude that 
their implementation would provide a more balanced approach to copyright enforcement.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Rise of Digital Copyright Infringement
The birth of the Internet granted artists, musicians, and writers the opportunity for global 
exposure never before achieved through traditional media, such as radio, television, live, books, 
or compact discs.  Ironically, consumers began utilizing the potential for the widespread 
distribution of copyrighted material via the Internet long before copyright holders or their agents 
started to take advantage of the possibility.3  During the 1990’s, Internet users began to make 
copyrighted material publicly available, both legally and illegally, on Web and FTP sites.4  As 
technology has since rapidly developed, it has become increasingly simple to reproduce, store, 
and disseminate copyrighted material as digital files.5  For example, the processing speed, 
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4storage capacity, and overall performance of personal computers have grown exponentially 
during the last twenty years, allowing copyrighted materials to be stored and played in ever 
increasing levels of quantity and quality.6  The ability to compress enormous media files while 
retaining the quality of the original has made the transfer and storage of large amounts of 
copyrighted material, such as songs and movies, progressively more efficient.7  Today, even the 
most inexperienced computer user can engage in copyrighted file sharing with the recent 
development of P2P networks, which allow users to locate and transfer files directly amongst 
themselves without the need for intermediate, centralized hubs or servers.8
The development of P2P networks and similar file sharing technology has probably had 
the most significant effect on digital copyright infringement.  Currently, there are more than 57 
million American users of file sharing technology who, together with millions of other users 
around the world, are downloading billions of music files every year.9  At any given time, 
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5roughly 700 to 900 million files are available on the infamous KaZaA network alone.10  Studies 
show that approximately 90% of the content shared on P2P networks is copyrighted material 
disseminated without authorization.11  Based on this 90% infringement rate, there are between 
630 and 810 million infringing files available just on KaZaA at any particular moment.  KaZaA, 
however, is not the only P2P network that is being used to share copyright infringing files.12
The explosive growth in computer and data transfer technology, especially the 
development of P2P networks, has fueled the rampant unauthorized dissemination of copyrighted 
material online.13  Naturally, this infringement has had a dramatic impact on the profits of many 
copyright owners, most notably those in the music recording industry.  Recent statistics 
demonstrate the considerable extent of this impact.  P2P networks began to take hold late in 
1999, and compact disc sales fell immediately, declining 7% in 2000, 10% in 2001, and 11% in 
2002.14  This annual decline in CD sales over the last three years represents more than $1 billion 
in lost annual revenues.15  Clearly, the unauthorized sharing of music files on P2P networks is 
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6having a substantial effect on the music industry’s revenues, and the problem is only getting 
more serious.16
The music industry, however, is not the only market sector feeling the squeeze that 
widespread copyright infringement is putting on profits.  A recent study found that 8 percent of 
American Internet users illegally downloaded at least one movie during a three-month period in 
2002, which is not insignificant considering the number of Internet users in the United States.17
And while the motion picture industry’s estimate of 400,000 illegal movie downloads per day 
may seem relatively small compared to the many millions of infringing music files downloaded 
daily, rapid technological development could cause that number to skyrocket within a few 
years.18  The software industry is also facing similar issues regarding copyright infringement.19
B. Copyright Owners Fight Back
Of course, the music industry and other copyright owners have not given up these lost 
revenues without a fight, both on the technological and legal fronts.  Copyright owners have 
attempted to protect their interests with new security tools, such as encryption and other copy-
protection measures.  This strategy has had only limited success, however, due to the rapidly 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn?pagename=article&node=&contentId=A23575-
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7evolving nature of technology.20  Developing new copyright protection systems is an expensive 
process and technologically sophisticated users are commonly able to circumvent such 
measures.21  To make matters worse, the methods of circumvention are generally shared over the 
Internet with less savvy users.22
Copyright owners have not had much more success on the legal front, or at least not until 
now.  Their difficulty up to this point has been finding a party to hold responsible for the 
unbounded copyright infringement that is taking place.  Copyright owners have been extremely 
wary of directly pursuing individual infringers for fear of creating bad publicity and alienating 
consumers.23  ISPs have not been effective targets because Title II of the DMCA, which is the 
focus of this Article, limits the liability of unwitting service providers in cases involving their 
subscribers’ digital copyright infringement.24  In addition, service providers have little control 
over their subscribers’ unauthorized downloading of copyrighted material.  
While the creators and distributors of P2P network software would appear to be 
appropriate defendants in actions for contributory or vicarious infringement, the courts’ holdings 
have fallen on both sides of this issue.25  Although copyright holders will likely continue to fight 
20
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effective).
21 Id.
22 Id.  In addition, copyright protection systems are extremely controversial and unpopular because they prevent 
many forms of fair use as well as allow infringement.
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8P2P network software distributors with increasing success,26 the very nature of P2P networks 
prevents copyright owners from effectively enjoining their creators to stop the sharing of 
infringing material.27  Typically, P2P networks do not operate from central servers that can be 
shut down or controlled.28  Once a user downloads the network software, he or she shares files 
directly with other users outside of the control of the network creators.  A victory in the 
courtroom obtaining an injunction against operation is meaningless if it cannot be enforced.  
Thus, copyright owners have been forced into a corner with only one way to fight out.  They 
cannot attack the parties enabling the online copyright infringement, so they must directly pursue 
the actual infringers.  As inefficient and distasteful as suing its own consumers for infringement 
may be, the RIAA announced on June 25, 2003, that it would begin bringing actions directly 
against the most “egregious infringers.”29
C. Identifying Individual Infringers
injunction entered against Aimster by the district court, concluding that the copyright owners were likely to succeed 
against Aimster on the basis of contributory infringement) and Kazaa/Buma-Stemra, Hof, Amsterdam, 28 maart 
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9Before copyright owners can sue any alleged infringers, they have to know whom to sue.  
Copyright owners, such as the Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA), employ 
agencies that use programs, known as “rangers” or “bots,” to search the shared files of computers 
logged into P2P networks for infringing files.30  According to the RIAA, “The software then 
downloads a sample of the infringing files, with date and time of access, and stores the user’s 
Internet Protocol (IP) address.”31  These programs also record the names of all the infringing 
files that they find.32  The RIAA claims that its employees manually review and verify the 
information collected by the search programs before taking any action.33  Because P2P network 
users operate anonymously, copyright owners are not able to directly obtain the user’s name, 
address, or other identification information.  The IP address, however, enables the copyright 
owner to identify the user’s service provider, which does possess that information.34  Thus, to 
obtain a user’s subscriber information, the copyright owner must subpoena the service provider 
pursuant to Section 512(h) of the DMCA.35  The subpoena process itself will be discussed in 
greater detail below. 
30
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Millennium Copyright Act, 5 VA. INTELL. PROP. L. NEWSLINE No. 2, at 5 (June 2003), available at
www.vsb.org/sections/ip/Newsline%20June%202003%20FINAL.pdf.
31
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Since announcing its latest strategy in June 2003, the RIAA has served well over 2,000 
DMCA subpoenas, at an average of 75 per week.36  Although service providers received only a 
limited number of subpoenas from copyright owners before this recent onslaught and responded 
to each of them without challenge,37 several providers have reacted to this new trend with 
motions to quash.38  Naturally, ISPs are extremely reluctant to freely release subscriber 
information on a large scale because such a response could drive away consumers.39  Service 
providers are also concerned about the potentially enormous administrative and legal costs that 
would be associated with complying with a flood of such subpoenas if other copyright owners 
were to follow the RIAA’s approach.40  In these cases, which will be discussed further below, the 
service providers have challenged the use of the subpoena provision on various statutory, 
constitutional, and policy grounds with varying success.  Somewhat unusually, consumer rights 
organizations and privacy advocates have aligned themselves with the service providers in 
challenging the DMCA subpoena provision, albeit certainly with different motives.  In any event, 
36 RIAA Responds, supra note 29, at 795.  Based on these subpoenas, the RIAA filed a first wave of 261 lawsuits 
against individual file sharers on September 8, 2003. 
37
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Matthew Oppenheim, RIAA’s vice president of business and legal affairs, the RIAA had only issued 96 § 512(h) 
subpoenas since the passage of the DMCA before Verizon became the first ISP to challenge one.  Id.
38
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Subpoena to Boston College, No. 1:03-MC-10210-JLT (Aug. 7, 2003); Pacific Bell Internet Servs. v. Recording 
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interpretation by the RIAA.
39
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40 District of Columbia Court Lacks Authority to Issue DMCA Subpoenas to Boston Schools, 66 ELECTRONIC COM. 
& L. REP. No. 1634, at 459 (Aug. 15, 2003).
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until these issues with the subpoena provision are resolved, the process of pursuing individual 
infringers will not be a smooth one for copyright owners.
III. THE DIGITAL MILLENNIUM COPYRIGHT ACT
A. Overview and Purpose of the DMCA
Congress enacted the DMCA in 1998 to “facilitate the robust development and world-
wide expansion of electronic commerce, communications, research, development, and education 
in the digital age.”41  Title I of the DMCA, which is not the focus of this Article, amended the 
Copyright Act42 to implement two recent World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) 
treaties, “bringing U.S. copyright law squarely into the digital age…”43  Title II was enacted to 
introduce a level of certainty with respect to ISPs’ potential liability for the online copyright 
infringement of their subscribers.44  It attempts to achieve this goal by clarifying exactly when a 
service provider is liable for its subscribers’ transmission or storage of infringing material on its 
systems and what remedies copyright owners have in such situations.45  In addition, Title II 
endeavors to help ensure the growth and efficiency of the Internet and protect the interests of 
copyright owners by “preserv[ing] strong incentives for service providers and copyright owners 
41 S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 1-2 (1998).
42
 17 U.S.C. §§ 501 et seq. (2000).
43 S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 2 (discussing the implementation of the WIPO Copyright Treaty and the WIPO 
Performances and Phonograms Treaty).
44 Id.
45 Id.
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to cooperate to detect and deal with copyright infringements that take place in the digital 
networked environment.”46
The enacted version of Title II came about largely as a result of lengthy negotiations 
between representatives of the major copyright owners and officials from the leading ISPs.47
When the DMCA was first proposed, it originally held service providers liable anytime one of its 
subscribers posted infringing material.48  Service providers were able to negotiate a compromise, 
however, whereby they would not be held liable for unwittingly hosting or transmitting 
infringing material for their subscribers, as long as they cooperated with copyright owners in 
combating infringement through various prescribed means.49
Title II amended chapter 5 of the Copyright Act50 to include a new section entitled, 
“Limitations on liability relating to material online.”51  As its name suggests, section 512 
expressly limits the liability of an ISP in specific situations where subscribers use its facilities to 
commit acts of copyright infringement.52  In subsections (a) through (d), section 512 provides 
service providers with “safe harbors” from direct, vicarious, and contributory liability for four
categories of activities involving infringement by users:  (a) where the ISP merely acts as a 
46 Id. at 37.
47 Id. at 9.  “Title II…reflects 3 months of negotiations supervised by Chairman Hatch and assisted by Senator 
Ashcroft among the major copyright owners and the major OSP’s and ISP’s.”
48
 Jason Krause, Caught by the Act: Judge Rules ISPs Must Name Clients Who Trade Copyrighted Material, 2 
A.B.A. J. E-Report 2 (2003).
49 Id.
50
 17 U.S.C. §§501 et seq. (2000).
51 Verizon I, 240 F. Supp. 2d at 26-27; 17 U.S.C. § 512.  This section is the heart of Title II and the source of the 
DMCA subpoena provision.
52 Verizon I, 240 F. Supp. 2d at 27.
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conduit for the transmission of infringing material;53 (b) where the ISP’s system is used for the 
intermediate or temporary storage of infringing material (“system caching”);54 (c) where the ISP 
hosts (stores online) infringing material on its servers at the direction of users;55 and (d) where 
the ISP refers or links users to the online location of infringing material via directories, index 
references, hypertext links, and other tools.56  In order to qualify for the immunity offered by 
these safe harbors, however, service providers must satisfy certain prescribed conditions, 
depending on which safe harbor is being claimed.57  For example, each of these four provisions 
essentially requires that the ISP have no actual knowledge of the infringing nature of the material 
at issue.58  Also, the service provider must terminate the accounts of subscribers engaging in 
repeat copyright infringement and must inform its subscribers of this policy.59  In addition to 
satisfying these conditions and others, service providers must cooperate with copyright owners in 
their efforts to enforce their copyrights.  Section 512 provides copyright owners with two 
powerful statutory weapons for use in their fight against online infringement, both of which 
require the cooperation of service providers to be effective: takedown notices60 and subpoena 
53
 17 U.S.C. § 512(a).
54
 § 512(b).
55
 § 512(c).
56
 § 512(d).
57
 Norman, supra note 23, at 392.
58 See § 512(a)(1)-(2) (requiring that the transmission of the infringing material be initiated by a person other than 
the ISP and that the transmission be “carried out through an automatic technical process”); § 512(b)(1)(A)-(B) 
(same); § 512(c)(1)(A) (requiring that the service provider not have actual knowledge that the material or activity is 
infringing); § 512(d) (same).
59
 § 512(i)(1)(A).
60
 § 512(c)(3).
14
authority.61  Although this Article focuses primarily on the latter tool, a discussion of the former 
is pertinent here for purposes of later comparison and understanding the overall structure of 
section 512.
B. The DMCA Takedown Provisions
Once a copyright owner discovers infringing material online in the manner described 
previously in Part II, it may issue a takedown notice to the appropriate ISP to “remove or disable 
access to” that material being made available by its subscriber, who is identifiable by his or her 
IP address.62  The requirements for a takedown notice are delineated in the safe harbor provision 
for ISPs unknowingly hosting infringing material on their servers, section 512(c).63  It must 
include the following:  
(i) A physical or electronic signature of a person authorized to act on behalf 
of the owner of an exclusive right that is allegedly infringed.
(ii) Identification of the copyrighted work claimed to have been infringed, or 
if multiple copyrighted works at a single online site are covered by a 
single notification, a representative list of such works at that site.
(iii) Identification of the material that is claimed to be infringing or to be the 
subject of infringing activity and that is to be removed or access to which 
is to be disabled, and information reasonably sufficient to permit the 
service provider to locate the material.
(iv) Information reasonably sufficient to permit the service provider to contact 
the complaining party…
61
 § 512(h).
62
 § 512(c)(3)(A)(iii).  See also § 512(b)(2)(E) (requiring the removal of infringing material from system cache upon 
notification by the copyright owner); § 512(c)(1)(C) (requiring the removal of infringing material from the ISP’s 
system or network upon notification by the copyright owner); § 512(d)(3) (requiring the removal of links or 
references to the location of infringing material upon notification by the copyright owner).  Obviously, there is no 
takedown provision for infringing material that merely passes through the ISP’s system or network, although many 
copyright holders have even issued takedown notices in such situations as well.
63
 § 512(c)(3).
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(v) A statement that the complaining party has a good faith belief that use of 
the material in the manner complained of is not authorized by the 
copyright owner, its agent, or the law.
(vi) A statement that the information in the notification is accurate, and under 
penalty of perjury, that the complaining party is authorized to act on 
behalf of the owner of an exclusive right that is allegedly infringed.64
Delivery of a takedown notice must occur through the service provider’s “designated agent.”65
In order for a service provider to qualify for liability protection under one of the four safe harbor 
provisions, it must designate an agent to receive such takedown notifications, as well as 
subpoenas.66  The service provider must make the designated agent’s contact information 
available to the public, both on its website and through the Copyright Office.67  Clearly, the 
purpose of this provision is to streamline the delivery process to the greatest extent practicable, 
ensuring that the enforcement of the takedown notice is prompt and expeditious.68
Upon receiving a substantially compliant takedown notice, the service provider must 
“remove or disable access to” the infringing material.69  If the service provider wishes to avoid 
possible liability for directly removing or disabling access to allegedly infringing material 
residing on its system, it must “take reasonable steps promptly to notify the subscriber that it has
removed or disabled access to the material.”70  If the service provider subsequently receives a 
64
 § 512(c)(3)(A).
65
 § 512(c)(2).
66 Id.
67 Id.  This contact information must include the name, address, phone number, and e-mail address of the agent.  § 
512(c)(2)(A).
68
 Many service providers, such as Verizon, Pacific Bell, and Comcast, are extremely large corporations with a 
number of administrative centers around the country.  This provision avoids loss and delay by ensuring that each 
takedown notification goes to the same location and is handled in the same manner.
69
 § 512(c)(1)(C).
70
 § 512(g)(2)(A).
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counter notification from the subscriber that the allegedly infringing material was removed as a 
result of mistake, it must promptly provide the copyright owner with a copy of the counter 
notification and inform the copyright owner that it will replace the removed material in 10 
business days unless the copyright owner pursues a court order restraining the subscriber from 
engaging in infringing activity.71  If the copyright owner does not alert the service provider that it 
has filed such an action, then the service provider must replace the removed material between 10 
and 14 business days following the receipt of the counter notification from the subscriber.72
With the fairly recent development of P2P networks, ISPs now commonly receive 
takedown notices pertaining to infringing material not residing on their systems or networks.73
In this situation, which is governed by the subsection (a) safe harbor provision, the ISPs merely 
act as conduits for the transmission of the infringing material.74  Thus, they cannot directly 
“remove or disable access to” the offending files.75  Section 512 does not explicitly state how 
this issue should be resolved, and the DC Circuit Court of Appeals recently held that takedown 
71
 § 512(g)(2)(B)-(C).  The counter notification must include the following information:
(A) A physical or electronic signature of the subscriber.
(B) Identification of the material that has been removed or to which access has been disabled 
and the location at which the material appeared before it was removed or access to it was 
disabled.
(C) A statement under penalty of perjury that the subscriber has a good faith belief that the 
material was removed or disabled as a result of mistake or misidentification of the 
material to be removed or disabled.
(D) The subscriber’s name, address, and telephone number…
    § 512(g)(3)(A)-(D).
72
 § 512(g)(2)(C).
73 See e.g., Bob Sullivan, Hollywood Gets Tough on Copying, MSNBC (July 12, 2003) (noting that the MPAA 
serves approximately 2,000 takedown notifications each week on ISPs for infringement taking place on P2P 
networks), at http://msnbc.msn.com/id/3078567/ (Feb. 17, 2004).
74
 § 512(a).
75 Verizon Appeal, 351 F.3d 1229, 1235 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
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notices cannot properly be issued in this situation.76  At least until this opinion was delivered, 
however, ISPs generally cooperated with copyright holders in this situation by warning the 
offending subscriber that if he or she did not expeditiously remove the infringing material, his or 
her Internet connection would be disabled.77
This takedown process contains several important safeguards, which protect both the 
service provider from liability and the subscriber from improper takedowns.  These safeguards 
are important to note for the sake of comparison because some are strangely lacking from the 
subpoena provision.  First, the copyright owner must include in the takedown notice the required 
information listed above, which allows the service provider to verify its accuracy.78  If the 
takedown notification is not substantially compliant with these requirements,79 the service 
provider is not treated as having knowledge of the claimed infringement and, thus, does not have 
to remove or disable access to the allegedly infringing files.80  These requirements for the 
notification are important because they allow the service provider to independently verify that 
the subscriber is indeed making infringing material available online.  As will be discussed 
shortly, these notification requirements must also be satisfied before a copyright owner can 
76 Id. at 1231.
77 See Sullivan, supra note 73; Manjoo, supra note 37; Verizon Appeal, 351 F.3d at 1232.
78 See supra note 64 and accompanying text (quoting § 512(c)(3)(A)).
79 See § 512(c)(3)(B)(ii) (defining substantial compliance).
80
 § 512(c)(3)(B)(i) (“a notification…that fails to comply substantially with the provisions of subparagraph (A) shall 
not be considered…in determining whether a service provider has actual knowledge or is aware of facts or 
circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent.”); § 512(c)(1)(A)(iii) (stating that the ISP must only 
remove or disable access to allegedly infringing material upon obtaining knowledge or awareness of the 
infringement).
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obtain a subpoena from the clerk of the issuing court, and is one of the few significant statutory 
safeguards in the subpoena process.81
Second, the procedure for notification and takedown provided in section 512 affords 
Internet users’ interests in making files and material available online with adequate due process 
protection from possible mistakes or abuse on the part of copyright owners.  As just described, 
the requirements for the notification itself allow the service provider to act as the first line of 
defense against improper takedown notices.  Additionally, takedowns require the provision of 
actual notice to subscribers.82  If the service provider removes or disables access to allegedly 
infringing material residing on its system, it must take reasonable steps to provide prompt notice 
to the subscriber.83  If the allegedly infringing material does not lie within the direct control of 
the service provider, as in the case of files shared on P2P networks, the service provider’s 
warning to the subscriber to personally remove the infringing files obviously serves the same 
notice function.  Such notice provides the subscriber with an opportunity to evaluate and 
possibly challenge the infringement allegation.  The subscriber is in the best position to know 
whether the relevant files are indeed infringing and to supply evidence if they are not.84  Thus, 
common sense suggests that the subscriber should be given actual notice of infringement claims 
and the removal of allegedly infringing files.  There is, however, no such notice requirement for 
the subpoena provision.
81
 § 512(h)(2)(A).
82
 § 512(g)(2)(A).
83 Id  Due to the extremely short time period that subscribers are given to respond to this notice (less than 10 days 
after the takedown), such notice must probably be delivered within 24 hours to be considered effective.  Note that 
this notice requirement does not prevent service providers from giving notice to subscribers before taking down the 
allegedly infringing material, as long as the material is taken down promptly.
84
 Davidson, supra note 27.
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Third, section 512 provides subscribers with two types of statutory remedies in the event 
of an improper takedown.  The first remedy imparts users with a cause of action against “any 
person who knowingly materially misrepresents…that material or activity is infringing…”85  A 
copyright holder making such a misrepresentation is liable for monetary damages, including 
costs and attorneys’ fees.86  The availability of this cause of action prevents copyright owners 
from abusing the takedown provision and non-copyright owners from using it merely for 
purposes of harassment.  
Section 512 also implies that subscribers may bring a cause of action against service 
providers that improperly remove allegedly infringing material from their systems or networks.87
Subsection (g) states that service providers will not be held liable for damages resulting from
removing infringing material from their systems, regardless of whether the material is infringing, 
so long as they adhere to the procedure outlined above.88  By implication, if a service provider 
does not comply with this procedure in removing allegedly infringing files from its systems or 
networks, the effected subscriber may realize a cause of action.  This provision gives service 
providers incentive to protect the interests of their subscribers, helps to ensure that service 
providers will deal with claims of infringement in a fair and consistent manner, and grants 
subscribers recourse with respect to improper takedowns.  Together these two statutory remedies 
provide users with protection from a broad range of abuse and impropriety with respect to the 
85
 § 512(f)(1).
86
 § 512(f).  This section cuts both ways, however, since a copyright owner may also sue a subscriber for damages 
based on misrepresentation in a counter notification that material was removed or disabled by mistake or 
misidentification.  § 512(f)(2).  A service provider may also recover any damages incurred as a result of a 
misrepresentation by a copyright owner or subscriber.  Id.
87
 § 512(g).
88
 § 512(g)(1).
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takedown process.  While the first remedy may also be available to those whose subscriber 
information is subpoenaed based on misrepresentation, the second remedy clearly only applies to 
the takedown process.
In addition to these built-in safeguards, the takedown provisions promote efficiency in 
the enforcement of copyrights.  The multi-step process for removal of allegedly infringing 
material tailors itself to the needs and issues of the individual situation and continues only as 
long as is necessary for the resolution of the conflict.  The process also preserves efficiency by 
providing for short deadlines and automatic, yet reversible, action.  If the subscriber or copyright 
owner does not respond to the notification or counter notification, respectively, that party’s 
concession to the takedown or reposting is assumed.  For example, if a copyright owner 
mistakenly identifies a subscriber’s file as infringing, there is no need for a lengthy challenge 
process or an injunction filing.  Such a problem is easily resolved with a simple counter 
notification from the subscriber to the copyright owner.89  On the other hand, when the online 
material is clearly infringing, the subscriber may simply concede its removal without taking any 
action at all, thus maximizing efficiency.90
The takedown process also efficiently resolves the rarer, more complicated situations that 
involve less clear-cut issues of copyright infringement.  The procedure allows for the efficient 
production of evidence from both sides through the notification and counter notification 
89
 § 512(g)(2)(B).  If the takedown notice was obviously issued by mistake, the evidence provided in the counter 
notification would almost certainly resolve such an error (assuming the mistake slipped past the ISP’s initial 
screening of the takedown notice in the first place).
90 Id.  If the subscriber does not promptly respond with a counter notification, the removed material is assumed to be 
infringing and remains offline.
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provisions,91 and if the parties themselves cannot resolve the conflict, the procedure allows the 
parties to bring it before the court in an injunction proceeding.92
This efficiency is extremely important within the context of online copyright 
enforcement.  Due to the rapid manner in which copyrighted works can be copied and distributed 
worldwide, it is crucial to the interests of copyright holders that infringing files be removed from 
the Internet as expeditiously as possible.93  With the vast number of Internet users worldwide, the 
existence of a single infringing file on a P2P network can have major repercussions for its 
copyright holder as it is disseminated in an exponential fashion.94  The large number of Internet 
users and the epidemic levels of infringement also create the potential for an explosion in the 
number of copyright enforcement actions brought by copyright owners.  With so much 
infringement occurring, it is essential to all parties involved that the method for dealing with it be 
as fast and efficient as possible.  A cumbersome enforcement system might bottleneck at various 
points in the process and cause undue delays.  Efficiency is also a concern for a subscriber who 
has had material mistakenly removed from the Internet.  Oftentimes, such removed material is 
significant to the subscriber’s website or business, and if it is non-infringing, it should be 
replaced with all reasonable promptness.  Although the takedown provision has already begun to 
significantly burden ISPs, which must scramble to promptly respond to many notices at one 
91
 §§ 512(c)(3), (g)(3). 
92
 § 512(g)(2)(C).
93 Verizon I, 240 F. Supp. 2d at 35 (citing S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 8).
94
 Motion to Enforce July 24, 2002 Subpoena Issued by this Court to Verizon Internet Services, Inc. and 
Memorandum in Support Thereof at 5, Verizon I, 240 F. Supp. 2d 24 (D.D.C. 2003).
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time,95 the procedures laid out in section 512 effectively promote the important goals of 
efficiency and expediency.
C. The DMCA Subpoena Provision
Although arguably more powerful in effect, the subpoena provision in the DMCA is 
actually somewhat secondary to the takedown notification provisions in at least two respects.  
First, the subpoena provision has been and still is utilized with much less frequency.96  The 
issuance of a subpoena implies more extreme consequences than the more passive issuance of a 
takedown notification, and such a step is generally taken in anticipation of bringing some type of 
legal action.  Currently, subpoenas are only being issued for the subscriber information of the 
more flagrant copyright infringers.97  Second, DMCA subpoenas must be served “piggybacked” 
on takedown notifications.  As will be described shortly, a copyright owner must serve the 
appropriate ISP with a takedown notification either prior to or simultaneously with its service of 
the subpoena for the infringer’s subscriber information.98  The fact that the subpoena provision 
is, in certain respects, secondary to the takedown provisions is significant in shedding light on 
how Congress intended it to be used.
95 See Skelton, supra note 30, at 6.
96 See Sullivan, supra note 73 (stating that the MPAA, by itself, issues approximately 2,000 takedown notices each 
week).  Before the RIAA introduced its new strategy in June 2003, only a very small number of subpoenas were 
issued relative to takedown notifications.  See Manjoo, supra note 37 (noting that the RIAA had only issued 96 
section 512(h) subpoenas since the passage of the DMCA before Verizon began its challenge).  Even now, the 
RIAA has only issued a few thousand subpoenas since launching its massive campaign and the subpoenas are being 
issued in conjunction with takedown notifications.  RIAA Subpoenas Halted, Electronic Frontier Foundation (Dec. 1, 
2003), at http://www.eff.org/IP/P2P/riaasubpoenas/ (last visited Feb. 17, 2004).
97 RIAA Responds, supra note 29.
98
 17 U.S.C. § 512(h)(5) (2000) (“Upon receipt of the issued subpoena, either accompanying or subsequent to the 
receipt of a [takedown] notification…, the service provider shall expeditiously disclose to the copyright owner…the 
information required by the subpoena…regardless of whether the service provider responds to the notification.”).
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The authority to obtain and serve a subpoena under the DMCA is found in section 512(h).  
Once a copyright owner discovers a probable infringer, it must prepare and submit a notification, 
just as it would for a typical takedown request.99  The copyright owner may then request from the 
clerk of the issuing court a subpoena for the subscriber information of the allegedly infringing 
user.100  This request must be filed with the following:
(A) a copy of a notification described in subsection (c)(3)(A) [the takedown 
notification];
(B) a proposed subpoena; and
(C) a sworn declaration to the effect that the purpose for which the subpoena 
is sought is to obtain the identity of an alleged infringer and that such 
information will only be used for the purpose of protecting rights under 
this title.101
Upon receiving this request, the clerk of the court must “expeditiously issue and sign the 
proposed subpoena and return it to the requester for delivery to the service provider” if it 
properly satisfies these three requirements.102  At no point in the process does the clerk exercise 
any independent discretion in evaluating the subpoena nor does a judge ever become involved at 
this stage.103  Once the clerk issues the subpoena, the copyright owner serves it on the 
appropriate designated agent of the service provider.104  Upon receipt of the subpoena, “the 
99 Id. See also supra note 65 and accompanying text (quoting the requirements for the takedown notification).
100
 § 512(h)(1).
101
 § 512(h)(2)(A)-(C).
102
 § 512(h)(4) (“If the notification filed satisfies the provisions of subsection (c)(3)(A), the proposed subpoena is in 
proper form, and the accompanying declaration is properly executed, the clerk shall expeditiously issue and sign the 
proposed subpoena and return it to the requester for delivery to the service provider.”).
103 Verizon II, 257 F. Supp. 2d at 250.  See also Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(a)(3) (describing similar procedures for the 
issuance of a federal subpoena).
104
 § 512(c)(2).  Although subsection (c)(2) does not expressly provide that the subpoena must be served on the 
designated agent, it is a logical conclusion because subsection (c)(2) requires the takedown notification to be 
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service provider shall expeditiously disclose to the copyright owner…the information required 
by the subpoena, notwithstanding any other provision of law and regardless of whether the 
service provider responds to the [takedown] notification.”105
Together with the structure of section 512, this language makes it very clear that there is 
no formal statutory process in place for contesting the appropriateness of the subpoena 
comparable to that provided for challenging a takedown notification.106  Such an appeal process 
would seem to be even more necessary with respect to a subpoena because the release of a 
subscriber’s identity cannot be undone.  Erroneously removed Internet content can be replaced, 
but identity information cannot be unlearned.  Thus, it is important that such information not be 
released erroneously in the first place.  Additionally, section 512(h) does not require service 
providers to give notice to subscribers whose information has been subpoenaed under the 
DMCA, which only compounds the problem and makes the inappropriate or mistaken release of 
identity information that much more likely.107
Once a service provider receives a section 512(h) subpoena requesting the identification 
information of one of its subscribers, it basically has two options:  respond to the subpoena with 
the appropriate information or challenge the subpoena with a motion to quash.  As mentioned 
above, until the RIAA announced its new strategy to pursue actions directly against individual 
delivered to the designated agent and subsection (h)(5) requires the subpoena to be served on the service provider 
either accompanying or subsequent to the delivery of the notification.  Id.; § 512(h)(5).
105
 § 512(h)(5).
106
 Section 512(h) does not contain a procedure similar to that found in subsection (g) for challenging the removal of 
allegedly infringing material.
107
 Davidson, supra note 27.  Note, however, that nothing in section 512 expressly prevents a service provider from 
giving notice to its subscribers if their information has been subpoenaed.
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infringers, service providers always chose the first option.108  Realizing that a dangerous new 
trend was in the offing, Verizon Internet Services created quite a stir in the legal community 
when it became one of the first ISPs to bring a significant challenge to a subpoena issued under 
section 512(h).109  Several other service providers, including two major universities, which act as 
service providers to their faculty and students, have followed Verizon’s lead in filing motions to 
quash subpoenas served on them by the RIAA.110  These cases have raised various 
interpretational issues and perceived problems—both constitutional and statutory—with respect 
to the DMCA provision.  Before Part IV discusses these issues, challenges, and the cases in 
which they have been raised, it is crucial to understand why this conflict between the service 
providers and copyright holders over section 512 arose in the first place.  
D. How was the DMCA Supposed to Work?
Clearly, there is serious confusion concerning just how the subpoena provision was 
intended to operate within the context of section 512.  The existence of this confusion is 
somewhat surprising considering that the two adversaries in this conflict, the music recording 
industry and the ISPs, were significantly responsible for the enacted version of section 512.111
These two sides worked together with legislators to craft a set of laws that would allow for the 
enforcement of copyrights and protect service providers from liability for their customers’ 
violations.  There would seem to be no rational explanation for conflict or confusion in a 
108 See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
109 Verizon I, 240 F. Supp. 2d at 26 (noting that this case, which involved the interpretation of the DMCA subpoena 
provision, presented an issue of first impression).
110 See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
111 S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 9.  Indeed, representatives of Verizon and the RIAA were personally involved in the 
negotiation of section 512.  Declan McCullagh, Verizon’s Copyright Campaign, CNET News.com (Aug. 27, 2002) 
(interview with Sarah Deutsch, Vice President & Associate General Counsel, Verizon Internet Services, Inc.), at
http://news.com/2008-1082-955417.html (last visited Feb. 17, 2004).
26
compromise to which these parties willingly agreed in the first place.  Granted, various factors 
have arisen that neither side could have anticipated when negotiating the compromise that 
became Section 512 of the DMCA,112 but could recent technological developments by 
themselves have stirred up the turmoil that surrounds the DMCA subpoena provision today?  
The answer to this question seems to lie in the additional fact that none of these issues 
arose until the RIAA announced its new strategy of suing individual infringers on a national 
scale.113  No longer are the copyright holders merely issuing subpoenas in conjunction with 
takedown notices for infringing material actually residing on service providers’ systems or 
networks.  Copyright holders are now issuing subpoenas for the identity of subscribers merely 
transmitting infringing material via their service providers’ networks, activity that is covered 
under subsection 512(a).114  This would not have been possible, at least not on a large scale, 
before the development of bots and P2P networks.  Before these two recent technological 
developments, copyright owners really had no method or tool for discovering infringing material 
unless it was physically posted on the Internet, which would generally require that the material 
reside on the systems or networks of the infringer’s ISP.115  In these situations, copyright owners 
would simply issue takedown notices to the appropriate service providers pursuant to section 
512(c) and occasionally serve subpoenas in the rarer event that the notices were ignored or the 
112 Verizon I, 240 F. Supp. 2d at 23 (noting that the development of both P2P software and bots had not yet occurred 
and were not anticipated at the time of the DMCA’s discussion and enactment).  Without a doubt, these two factors 
played a significant role in creating the immense conflict currently raging between service providers and copyright 
owners, but they were likely more in the nature of catalysts than causes.
113 See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text. 
114
 McCullagh, supra note 111.
115
 Tools able to search through material as it is sent and received by a service provider, known as “packet sniffers,” 
remain cutting-edge technology and are not readily available to the public.  
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copyright holder felt a lawsuit was warranted by the seriousness of the infringement.116  It 
appears that at least the service providers expected that this was how section 512, and especially 
the subpoena provision, was intended and would continue to operate.  This perspective is 
supported by Verizon’s repeated arguments that section 512 was primarily intended as a notice 
and takedown provision and that the subpoena authority is restricted to situations involving 
infringing materials actually residing on service providers’ systems or networks.117
The introduction of P2P networks and search bots changed the entire context of section 
512 and how it could be used to enforce copyrights.  In addition to creating centralized lists of 
digital files available for sharing, P2P networks also essentially created readily available, 
searchable lists of infringement and infringers.  The employment of search bots and rangers has 
made the task of combing these networks for infringement extremely fast and efficient.118  These 
two developments have allowed copyright owners to begin seeking out infringing activity 
covered under the subsection (a) safe harbor provision—involving the transmission of infringing 
material over the systems and networks of service providers—in addition to infringement 
covered under subsection (c)—involving the storage of infringing material on the service 
provider’s systems or networks.  Of course, infringing material was transmitted over service 
providers’ networks long before P2P networks appeared on the digital transfer scene,119 but 
copyright owners really had no method of tracking such traffic.  Ironically, the development of 
116
 Wikipedia, Online Copyright Infringement Liability Limitation Act, at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/OCILLA (last 
visited Feb. 17, 2004).
117 See e.g., Manjoo, supra note 37 (quoting Sarah Deutsch, associate general counsel for Verizon:  “I was one of the 
10 industry representatives who was there to draw up this law…and it was clearly our interpretation that the content 
would have to be on our network.  We agreed to a process called ‘notice and takedown’ for material that was on the 
network.”).
118 See Skelton, supra note 30, at 5.
119
 E-mail, instant messaging, and ftping are still commonly used methods for transferring files directly between 
users.
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P2P networks, which enabled users to more easily engage in copyright infringement, also 
enabled copyright owners to more easily discover such infringement.
The development of P2P networks and search bots has thus wrought several major 
changes in the manner in which copyrights are enforced online.  Most importantly, copyright 
owners are now taking action against users merely transmitting infringing files across their 
service providers’ networks as well as those users actually uploading infringing files onto their 
service providers’ systems for hosting purposes.  Once copyright owners realized that the first 
type of infringement far outweighed the second type, it was only a matter of time before they 
responded accordingly by issuing section 512(h) subpoenas.120
Due to the fact that no one expected that subsection 512(a) would ever serve as a basis 
for exercising the subpoena authority like subsection 512(c),121 a fierce debate has risen as to 
whether copyright holders may issue a subpoena for the identity of a subscriber who merely 
transfers infringing materials across a provider’s network, but does not store such materials on 
the provider’s servers.  Copyright owners argue that the power to issue subpoenas to service 
providers protected under subsection (a) has always existed in section 512, regardless of whether 
such use was foreseen.  They reason that, by including in section 512 each of the four safe harbor 
subsections that limit the liability of service providers, Congress intended to protect from 
secondary liability the gamut of service provider functions that could be used by subscribers to 
engage in infringement.122  At the same time, Congress also intended to give copyright owners 
recourse, through the help of service providers, against infringers in each of those four 
120 Verizon I, 240 F. Supp. 2d at 35 (noting that P2P networks provide the largest opportunity for online copyright 
infringement).
121 Verizon Appeal, 351 F.3d at 1238.
122 Verizon I, 240 F. Supp. 2d at 27.
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situations.123  The fact that copyright owners did not have until recently the capabilities 
necessary to take advantage of that recourse in one or more of those prescribed situations does 
not mean that the recourse never existed.124
On the other hand, ISPs contend that the language of section 512 precludes the issuance 
of a subpoena to a service provider merely acting as a conduit for the transmission of infringing 
material across its networks.125  Pursuant to the subpoena provision, the proposed subpoena 
offered to the Clerk of the Court must contain a copy of a takedown notification.126  Such a 
notification must identify the material “to be removed or access to which is to be disabled” by 
the service provider.127  The service providers maintain that satisfaction of these requirements is 
impossible in situations falling under subsection (a).128  Their argument is essentially that where 
a subscriber is merely transmitting infringing material over their networks, the ISP does not 
possess the ability to remove or disable access to such material, which is not on its servers.129
Thus, there can be no proper takedown notification under subsection (a) and, hence, no subpoena 
based on that subsection.130  Significantly, the fact that subsection (a) never even refers to the 
123 Id. at 34.
124
 Part IV.A.1, infra, will discuss how the structure and legislative history may support this conclusion that the 
DMCA subpoena power was intended to apply to infringement in the context of all four types of service provider 
functions: transmitting, system caching, hosting, and linking (not necessarily hosting alone, as argued by Verizon).
125 Verizon Appeal, 351 F.3d at 1233.
126
 17 U.S.C. § 512(h)(2)(A) (2000).
127
 § 512(c)(3)(A)(iii).
128 Verizon Appeal, 351 F.3d at 1234-35.
129 Id.
130 Id. at 1235.
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takedown notification, while subsections (b) through (d) do, supports the service providers’ 
argument.131
Neither party could have anticipated that the subpoena power would be used in the 
manner in which it is currently being employed, and now the service providers are fighting a 
monster that they themselves helped to create.  Now that the issue of how section 512 was 
intended to work has been addressed, a vital question still remains: how should section 512 
work?  An answer to this question may not provide a resolution for all the issues that have been 
raised against the DMCA subpoena provision, but it may help the legislature to understand the 
need for changes in the provision and what those changes should be.  Beginning the journey
toward this goal, Part IV will discuss the various issues that have been raised with respect to the 
DMCA subpoena provision, highlighting the arguments of both the service providers and 
copyright owners in the recent cases, as well as the opinions of the courts. 
IV. ISSUES REGARDING THE CURRENTLY ENACTED DMCA SUBPOENA PROVISION
The cases in which service providers have challenged subpoenas issued pursuant to 
section 512(h) have involved issues falling into three primary categories: (1) statutory 
construction issues, (2) constitutional issues, and (3) policy issues concerning the provision’s 
potential for abuse.132  Initially, the major service providers were hesitant to raise constitutional 
issues with respect to the subpoena provision because they had played such an integral role in the 
original drafting process of Title II of the DMCA.133  Instead, the service providers focused on 
131 Id. at 1234.
132 See generally Verizon Appeal, 351 F.3d 1229 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
133 See McCullagh, supra  note 111. 
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statutory construction and interpretation issues, leaving the constitutional issues to be argued by 
privacy and consumer rights advocates, such as the Electronic Frontier Foundation and the 
Center for Democracy & Technology, in their amicus curiae briefs.134  The service providers 
quickly realized, however, that they would need all the legal ammunition they could acquire to 
levy a successful challenge against the subpoena provision and they began objecting to the 
subpoenas on several constitutional grounds as well.135  Each of these challenges to the DMCA 
subpoena power will be discussed in turn.
A. Statutory Construction Issues
1. To What Types of ISPs does the Subpoena Provision Apply?
In the first Verizon case, which has been referred to in this Article as Verizon I, the 
service provider primarily argued that the section 512(h) subpoena provision did not apply to it 
because it was serving only as a conduit for the infringing activity of the subscriber at issue.136
Verizon contended that it merely provided Internet access to the allegedly infringing subscriber 
and that the subpoena provision was only intended to apply to service providers actually hosting 
the allegedly infringing material on their systems or networks.137  Because its activities fell 
within the scope of the safe harbor provision in subsection (a) for service providers acting as a 
conduit for the transmission of infringing material, not within the scope of the safe harbor 
provision in subsection (c) for service providers hosting infringing material on their systems or 
134 See e.g., Verizon I, 240 F. Supp. 2d at 41-42 (noting that Verizon did not assert that the section 512(h) subpoena 
power is unconstitutional; those issues were only raised by the amici curiae supporting Verizon).
135 See e.g., Verizon II, 257 F. Supp. 2d at 246-47 (noting that in Verizon I, the service provider only challenged the 
RIAA’s subpoenas on the basis of statutory construction, but that in the present case, Verizon also challenged the 
constitutionality of the subpoena provision).
136 Verizon I, 240 F. Supp. 2d at 29.
137 Id. (discussing Verizon’s argument that its activities fell within the safe harbor provision of subsection (a) and 
that that the subpoena provision only applies to service providers whose conduct falls within the activity described 
in subsection (c)).
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networks, Verizon argued that the takedown notification provision, which is found within 
subsection (c)(3)(A), did not apply to it and consequently neither did the subpoena provision.138
On the other hand, the RIAA argued that the subpoena provision and subsection 
(c)(3)(A), detailing the requirements for the notification provision, are freestanding provisions,
which are referenced in several other areas outside of subsection (c).139  Thus, according to the 
RIAA, the notification and subpoena provisions apply to service providers engaging in each of 
the four types of activities granted safe harbor under the DMCA, not merely to service providers 
that are actually hosting infringing material on their systems or networks.140  Based on this 
interpretation, the subpoena was valid no matter which safe harbor Verizon fell under.141
Finding none of Verizon’s arguments entirely persuasive, the District Court for the 
District of Columbia adopted the RIAA’s interpretation of section 512.142  The court supported 
its decision with a convincing array of reasons.  First, the court found that “[t]he statutory text of 
the DMCA provides clear guidance for construing the subpoena authority of subsection (h) to 
apply to all service providers under the act.”143  The term “service provider” is clearly referenced 
throughout the subpoena provision.144  Significantly, section 512 provides two distinct 
definitions of service provider in a freestanding definition section: “a narrow definition as the 
term is used solely within subsection (a), and a broader definition governing all other 
138 Id.
139
 Motion to Enforce July 24, 2002 Subpoena Issued by this Court to Verizon Internet Services, Inc. and 
Memorandum in Support Thereof at 14, Verizon I, 240 F. Supp. 2d 24 (D.D.C. 2003).
140 Id. at 15.
141 Verizon I, 240 F. Supp. 2d at 29, n.3.
142 Id. at 39.
143 Id. at 30 (emphasis added).
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subsections, which specifically includes a “service provider” under subsection (a) as well.”145
Based on this express two-part definition of “service provider” found in subsection (k), the court 
found it clear that the broader, all-encompassing definition applies to the term as it is used in the 
subsection (h) subpoena provision.146  Thus, it held that the subpoena provision applies to all 
service providers, including those engaged in activities described in each of the safe harbor 
provisions.147
Second, the court held that Verizon’s interpretation was strained and conflicted with the 
overall structure of section 512 because the subsection (c)(3)(A) notification provision is 
referenced in several other places in section 512 outside of the subsection (c) safe harbor 
provision.148  Thus, the notification provision must necessarily apply outside of the context of 
subsection (c) and its safe harbor for ISPs hosting infringing material on their systems and 
networks.149  In addition, the section 512(h) subpoena provision is not limited or restricted in any 
145 Id. (citing § 512(k)).  Section 512(k) states:
(k) Definitions.
(1) Service provider.
(A) As used in subsection (a), the term “service provider” means an entity 
offering the transmission, routing, or providing of connections for 
digital online communications, between or among points specified by a 
user, of material of the user’s choosing, without modification to the 
content of the material as sent or received.
(B) As used in this section, other than subsection (a), the term “service 
provider” means a provider of online services or network access, or the 
operator of facilities therefore, and includes an entity described in 
subparagraph (A).
146 Id. at 31 (noting that the subsection (c)(3)(A) notification provision is referenced in both the subsection (b) and 
(d) safe harbor provisions for system caching of and linking to infringing material).
147 Id.
148 Id. at 32.
149 Id.
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fashion to service providers covered under subsection (c).150  The subpoena provision is located 
in a freestanding subsection and is in no way solely tied to service providers falling within the 
scope of subsection (c).151
Finally, the court noted that Verizon’s interpretation conflicted with Congressional intent 
with respect to section 512.152  If Verizon’s interpretation were adopted, “the statute would fail 
significantly to address many contexts in which a copyright owner needs to utilize the subpoena 
process in order to discern the identity of an apparent copyright infringer.”153  Verizon’s 
interpretation would prevent a copyright owner from having any recourse against a subscriber 
who merely used his or her Internet service for the transmission of infringing files.  Thus, 
Verizon’s interpretation “would create a huge loophole in Congress’s effort to prevent copyright 
infringement on the Internet,” through which infringing users of P2P networks would be able to 
escape liability.154  Clearly, Congress could not have intended such an effect.
Supporting its holding textually, structurally, and with legislative intent, the Verizon I
court convincingly laid Verizon’s interpretation of section 512 to rest.  On appeal, however, the 
DC Circuit reversed the trial court’s decision and resurrected Verizon’s position based on a 
textual analysis.155  The Court of Appeals analyzed section 512 in the same manner as the district 
150 Id. at 33 (noting that if Congress had intended for the subpoena provision to merely apply to subsection (c) 
situations, it would have placed the provision within subsection (c), named the provision to reflect its application to 
a narrow subset of service providers, or taken other similar explicit measures).
151 Id.
152 Id. at .
153 Id. at 34.
154 Id. at 35.
155 Verizon Appeal, 351 F.3d at 1231.
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court, looking to the text and the structure of the statute before turning to the legislative intent 
and purpose, but focused on different elements of the statute to arrive at the opposite conclusion.
Beginning its opinion with an examination of the text of section 512, the court agreed 
with Verizon’s argument that the subpoena provision does not apply to service providers acting 
merely as a conduit for P2P communications.156  The court reasoned that the statute expressly 
provides that the issuance of a subpoena under section 512(h) requires a takedown 
notification,157 which must identify the allegedly infringing material “that is to be removed or 
access to which is to be disabled.”158  The takedown notification requirement is a condition 
precedent to the issuance of a subpoena under section 512(h).159  Because Verizon was merely 
acting as a conduit for the transmission of infringing material on P2P networks and was not 
storing the infringing material on its server, the RIAA could not identify material to be removed 
or access to which is to be disabled.160  A service provider merely acting as a conduit for the 
transmission of infringing material can neither “remove” nor “disable access to” the material 
because it is not stored on the provider’s servers.161  Since it does not control the content on its 
subscribers’ computers, it cannot actually remove or disable access to the infringing material.162
Since this crucial requirement for the takedown notification cannot be satisfied where the service 
156 Id. at 1233.
157 Id. at 1234 (citing § 512(h)(2)(A)).
158 Id. at 1235 (quoting § 512(c)(3)(A)(iii)).
159 Id. (quoting § 512(h)(4), “‘If the notification filed satisfies the provisions of § 512(c)(3)(a)’ and the other content 
requirements of § 512(h)(2) are met, then ‘the clerk shall expeditiously issue and sign the proposed subpoena…for 
delivery’ to the ISP.”).
160 Id.
161 Verizon Appeal, 351 F.3d at 1235.
162 Id.
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provider is merely acting as a conduit, the takedown notification requirement for obtaining a 
subpoena cannot be met, and thus no subpoena may be issued.163
The RIAA contended that a service provider can disable access to infringing material “by 
terminating the offending subscriber’s Internet account.”164  The court rejected this argument 
based on the fact that Congress expressly treated disabling a subscriber’s access to infringing 
material and disabling access to the Internet as two distinct remedies.165  The court compared 
section 512(j)(1)(A)(i), which authorizes an injunction restraining an ISP “from providing access 
to infringing material,” with section 521(j)(1)(A)(ii), which authorizes an injunction restraining 
an ISP “from providing access to a subscriber or account holder…who is engaging in fringing 
activity…by terminating the accounts of the subscriber or account holder.”166  Noting that 
“where different terms are used in a single piece of legislation, the court must presume that 
Congress intended the terms have different meanings,” the court concluded that the provision of 
these two distinct remedies establishes that “terminating a subscriber’s account is not the same as 
removing or disabling access by others to the infringing material resident on the subscriber’s 
computer.”167
The Court of Appeals further bolstered its opinion with an analysis of the structure of 
section 512.168  Verizon noted that section 512(h), the subpoena provision, specifically 
references the takedown notification provision, which is found in subsection (c), but does not 
163 Id. at 1234-35.
164 Id. at 1235.
165 Id.
166 Id.
167 Verizon Appeal, 351 F.3d at 1235.
168 Id. at 1236-37.
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explicitly reference subsections (a), (b), or (d).169  Verizon thus argued that the subpoena 
provision only applies to situations governed by subsection (c), where the service provider hosts 
the infringing material on its servers.170  Despite rejecting Verizon’s overly broad contention that 
the subpoena provision only applies to section 512(c) cases, the court agreed with Verizon’s 
narrower conclusion that it does not apply to section 512(a).171  The court pointed out that 
subsections (b) and (d), which govern a service provider’s temporary storage of infringing 
material on its systems and a service provider’s hosting of a tool linking users to infringing 
material, respectively, both cross-reference the takedown notification provision upon which the 
subpoena provision relies.172  Thus, the court concluded that the subpoena provision also applies 
to subsections (b) and (d).173  This rationale is logical because, as the court noted, all three 
subsections involve a service provider’s storage of infringing material on its servers in some 
capacity.174  Subsection (a), however, does not involve such storage, but rather the transmission 
of infringing material.  As described above, because the service provider does not have the 
ability to remove or disable access to infringing material not stored on its systems or network, it 
makes sense that subsection (a) does not reference the takedown provision and that the subpoena 
provision does not apply to subsection (a).175
169 Id. at 1236.
170 Id.
171 Id. at 1237.
172 Id.
173
 Verizon Appeal, 351 F.3d at 1237.
174 Id.
175 Id.
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Looking to the purpose and legislative intent behind section 512, the court did note that it 
was unfortunate that Congress was not able to anticipate the creation of P2P technology and 
accordingly draft legislation that would fully protect copyrights from digital infringement.176
The court held that despite the fact that Congress likely did not intend to leave such a broad 
loophole in the copyright enforcement law, it is not the place of the courts to “rewrite the DMCA 
in order to make it fit a new and unforeseen Internet architecture, no matter how damaging that 
development has been to the music industry…”177  The court concluded that this problem must 
be addressed by Congress because only “‘Congress has the constitutional authority and the 
institutional ability to accommodate fully the varied permutations of competing interests that are 
inevitably implicated by such new technology.’”178
Although the Court of Appeal’s decision seems somewhat unfair from a policy 
perspective, it was the right one in terms of balancing long-term interests.  The court recognized 
the harm that illegal P2P file sharing has done to the entertainment industry, but correctly 
concluded that it did not have the resources to properly take into account the many competing 
interests and the high stakes involved.179  This decision properly placed the weight of resolving 
the many issues that have arisen with respect to the DMCA subpoena provision squarely on the 
shoulders of Congress, where it belongs.  As of the time that this case was decided, Congress had 
already begun to address the task of updating digital copyright protection legislation to deal with 
P2P technology.180 Unfortunately, the Court of Appeals did not address the constitutional 
176 Id. at 1238.
177 Id.
178 Id.
179
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180 Id. at 1238-39.
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challenges that Verizon brought against the subpoena provision, which were rejected by the 
district court.181  Analyses of these issues would have been well within the court’s province and 
would have provided Congress with valuable guidance in restructuring section 512.
2. Does Section 512(h) trump Rule 45 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure?
Another significant constructional issue relates to the interpretation of the DMCA in the 
context of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  The section 512(h) subpoena provision grants 
copyright owners enhanced subpoena authority that is significantly greater than that offered by 
Rule 45.182  One of the major debates regarding the confluence of these two subpoena provisions 
is whether the DMCA subpoena power trumps the geographic limitation requirements set out in 
Rule 45.183  The Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) first raised this issue in court after 
it received a subpoena from the RIAA demanding the subscriber information of an allegedly 
infringing student.184  Before analyzing this case, it is necessary to briefly describe the provisions 
relating to service and delivery of subpoenas under both Rule 45 and section 512.
Section 512(h) provides that “[a] copyright owner…may request the clerk of any United 
States district court to issue a subpoena to a service provider for identification of an alleged 
infringer…”185  It further mandates that “the procedure for issuance and delivery of the 
subpoena, and the remedies for noncompliance with the subpoena, shall be governed to the 
greatest extent practicable by those provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governing 
181 Id. at 1231.
182 See McCullagh, supra note 111 (referring to the DMCA subpoena provision as “turbocharged”).
183 District of Columbia Court Lacks Authority to Issue DMCA Subpoenas to Boston Schools, 66 ELECTRONIC COM. 
& L. REP. No. 1634, at 459 (Aug. 15, 2003).
184
 In re Subpoena to the Mass. Inst. of Tech., No. 1:03-MC-10209-JLT (Aug. 7, 2003).
185
 17 U.S.C. § 512(h)(1) (2000) (emphasis added).
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the issuance, service, and enforcement of a subpoena duces tecum.”186  Rule 45 is the relevant 
provision pertaining to subpoenas duces tecum in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  It states 
that “a subpoena for production or inspection shall issue from the court for the district in which 
the production or inspection is to be made.”187  In addition, a subpoena may be served at any 
place within the district of the issuing court or at any place outside the district that is within 100 
miles of the location where the subpoena is served.188  Rule 45, however, also states that “when a 
statute of the United States provides therefor, the court upon proper application and cause shown 
may authorize the service of a subpoena at any other place.”189  Basically, Rule 45 allows federal 
law to mandate nationwide service of process when appropriate.
In the case of In re Subpoena to the Massachusetts Institute of Technology,190 MIT 
initially noted in its memorandum in support of its motion to quash that section 512(h) requires 
that “‘the procedure for issuance and delivery’ of any subpoena issued pursuant to the DMCA 
‘shall be governed to the greatest extent practicable by those provisions of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure governing the issuance, service, and enforcement of a subpoena duces 
tecum.’”191  Accordingly, MIT argued that the subpoena served by the RIAA violated the 
186
 § 512(h)(6).
187 FED. R. CIV. P. 45(a)(2) (emphasis added).
188 Id. 45(b)(2).
189 Id.
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 Note that the RIAA obtained the subpoena from the United States district Court for the District of Columbia and 
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geographic limitations imposed by Rule 45 because they were issued from the United States 
District Court for the District of Columbia and served on MIT in Massachusetts to produce 
documents in Washington, D.C.192  According to MIT, the RIAA’s subpoena did not comport 
with the restrictions of Rule 45 for either the issuance or the service of subpoenas duces tecum.  
First, Rule 45(a)(2) provides that a subpoena for the production of documents must issue from 
the court for the district in which the production is to be made. 193  In this case, the subpoena 
issued from Washington, D.C., but the production was to be made from Massachusetts.  Second, 
the RIAA’s subpoena violated the rule governing service, which provides that subpoenas must be 
served within the district of the issuing court.194  Although Rule 45(b)(2) also provides that 
subpoenas may be served outside the district from which they issue, this option only applies if 
the place of service is “within 100 miles of the place of the…production specified in the 
subpoena.”195  Because Massachusetts, the place of service, is clearly more than 100 miles from 
Washington, D.C, the place of production, the option does not apply.  MIT noted that Rules 
45(a)(2) and (b)(2) together “require that a subpoena duces tecum be issued from a convenient 
United States District Court, so that a third-party like MIT may seek judicial assistance without 
the burden of traveling to a distant district.”196  MIT contended that the RIAA’s subpoena should 
192 Id. at 5.
193 Id. (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 45(a)(2)).
194 FED. R. CIV. P. 45(b)(2).
195
 MIT Memorandum at 5 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 45(b)(2)).
196 Id. at 5-6 (admitting that the production of records in response to the RIAA’s subpoena would not be 
inconvenient or burdensome in and of itself, but asserting that having to litigate the validity of the subpoena in a 
distant forum would be inconvenient and burdensome).
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be quashed because it violated both the rules governing the issuance and service of subpoenas 
duces tecum and the policies underlying those rules.197
In its motion to enforce the subpoena, the RIAA responded with several 
counterarguments to these issues that MIT raised in its motion to quash.  First, the RIAA 
contended that subpoenas issued pursuant to the DMCA are not subject to the territorial 
limitations imposed on subpoenas issued pursuant to Rule 45 because “Congress intended the 
DMCA subpoena process to be streamlined and expeditious to fulfill its functions.”198  The 
DMCA subpoenas, the RIAA argued, “are not broad discovery mechanisms” like Rule 45 
subpoenas, but rather “are targeted to ensure that a discrete amount of information is made 
available for the limited purpose of enabling a copyright owner to pursue its rights.”199   Based 
on clear Congressional intent, DMCA subpoenas must enable copyright owners to enforce their 
rights quickly and efficiently “notwithstanding any other provision of law.”200  According to the 
RIAA, MIT’s interpretation conflicts with this intent by slowing and burdening the DMCA 
subpoena process.  Essentially, MIT’s interpretation would force copyright owners “to have 
counsel in every one of the 94 judicial districts, ready at a moment’s notice to serve 
subpoenas.”201
The RIAA claimed that this conclusion is also supported by the language of section 
512(h)(6), which states that “unless otherwise provided by this section…, the procedure for 
197 Id. at 6-7.
198
 Motion to Enforce Subpoena to MIT at 10
199 Id.
200 Id. at 12-13 (quoting § 512(h)(5)).
201 Id. at 13.  The RIAA noted that “[i]n tracking down a single infringer, a copyright owner may have to obtain 
multiple subpoenas to multiple ISPs.  Forcing the copyright owner to go to multiple courts to identify one infringer 
is a burden that would seriously frustrate the goals of the DMCA.”  Id. at 13 n.3.  While this unlikely scenario is 
somewhat of an exaggeration, the underlying argument is not without merit.
43
issuance and delivery of the subpoena…shall be governed to the greatest extent practicable0” by 
Rule 45.202  This language, according to the RIAA, makes it clear that although the procedures of 
Rule 45 generally apply to subpoenas issued pursuant to the DMCA, Rule 45 is inapplicable 
“whenever it would conflict with section 512(h) or when application of Rule 45 would not be 
practicable, given the goals that section 512(h) advances.”203  The application of the 
geographical restrictions in this case would thwart the goals of section 512(h) and the purpose of 
the DMCA.204
Second, the RIAA contended that even if traditional service under Rule 45 would 
normally be required for DMCA subpoenas, the DMCA authorizes nationwide service of 
process.  In cases involving the enforcement of federal law, Congress has the power to authorize, 
either expressly or impliedly, nationwide service of process,205 and Section 512(h)(1) of the 
DMCA authorizes the issuance of subpoenas by the “clerk of any United States district court.”206
The RIAA based its contention on various cases involving subpoena provisions within other 
federal statutes, such as the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTC Act) and the Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA).207  The RIAA argued 
that these cases suggest that the determination of whether a statute authorizes nationwide service 
202 Id. at 13-14; § 512(h)(6) (emphasis added).
203
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204 Id. at 14.
205 Id. (citing Mariash v. Morrill, 496 F.2d 1138, 1143 n.6 (2d Cir. 1974); United States v. Congress Constr. Co., 222 
U.S. 199 (1911); Robertson v. R.R. Labor bd., 268 U.S. 619, 622 (1925); First Nat’l Bank of Canton v. Williams, 
252 U.S. 504, 509-510 (1920); United States v. Bliss, 108 F.R.D. 127, 135 (E.D. Mo. 1985)).
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depends on the policy goals of the particular statute and whether nationwide service is necessary 
to effectuate those goals.208
With respect to the RIAA’s second argument, MIT countered that the phrase “any United 
States district court” merely signifies “that a copyright holder need not go to any particular court 
to issue a DMCA subpoena, but may instead have it issued from any district in the federal court 
system that has authority to issue such a subpoena.  Citing to Robertston v. Railroad Labor 
Board, MIT noted that the U.S. Supr eme Court expressly rejected the RIAA’s contention when it 
held that the phrase, “any District Court of the United States,” merely referred to “a court that 
has jurisdiction under otherwise applicable rules to issue the subpoena.”209  MIT also attempted 
to distinguish several of the cases cited by the RIAA based on the fact that they involved statutes 
that much more explicitly authorized nationwide service of process.210  Quoting Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation v. Abrams,211 MIT concluded, “Congress knows how to authorize 
nationwide service of process when it wants to provide for it.  That Congress failed to do 
so…argues forcefully that such an authorization was not its intention.”212
The issue of whether the DMCA subpoena power trumps the procedural requirements 
mandated by Rule 45 remains essentially unresolved.  While the Massachusetts district court 
granted MIT’s motion to quash, it did so in a single sentence opinion, which did little to shed 
208 Id. at 15.
209
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light on how the courts will approach this issue in the future.213  Instead of challenging the 
Massachusetts district court’s order, it appears that the RIAA will simply refile for a second 
subpoena in that court,214 which will delay a more substantial resolution of this issue until it is 
raised again.
It is difficult to predict which side the courts will favor on this issue.  Comparing the 
arguments of the RIAA and MIT in this case, each has its strengths, but MIT’s interpretation 
appears to be the more sound of the two.  A purely textual reading seems to support MIT’s 
position that a subpoena issued pursuant to the DMCA must comply with the geographical 
limitations of Rule 45, especially in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Robertson, which 
held that the phrase relied on by the RIAA does not by itself authorize nationwide service.215  In 
addition, section 512(h)(6) clearly states that the procedure for issuance and delivery of the 
DMCA subpoena is to be governed by the provisions of Rule 45, unless otherwise provided by 
section 512.  Outside of subsection 512(h), the only provision discussing procedure for issuance 
or delivery may be found in subsection (c)(2), which establishes that takedown notifications must 
be delivered to the service provider’s designated agent.216  Nothing in the language of section 
512 expressly conflicts with the application of Rule 45.  Textually, there is little support for the 
RIAA’s interpretation that the geographical limitations of Rule 45 do not apply to DMCA 
subpoenas.
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From a policy perspective, however, the RIAA raises a legitimate point that one of the 
primary purposes of section 512 is to enable the enforcement of copyrights in an expedient 
manner.217  But would the imposition of the geographical limitations of Rule 45 significantly 
obstruct this goal as the RIAA contends?218  Although the RIAA was guilty of exaggeration 
when it suggested that such restrictions would require copyright owners “to have counsel in 
every one of the 94 judicial districts, ready at a moment’s notice to serve subpoenas,” imposing 
the geographical limitations of Rule 45 would indeed place a large burden on copyright 
owners.219  Once the conflict concerning the interpretation of section 512 has been substantially 
resolved, the number of valid and accurate subpoenas will almost certainly be far greater than the 
number of erroneous subpoenas that must be challenged.  This would suggest, in the interest of 
efficiency, that the RIAA’s interpretation be adopted.  Rather than forcing copyright owners to 
obtain subpoenas from different jurisdictions each time a new service provider is involved, 
efficiency would be maximized by forcing the service provider to challenge the subpoena in the 
issuing court in the much rarer event that a subpoena is invalidly or mistakenly issued.  
For example, copyright owner X issues DMCA subpoenas to three different service 
providers in districts A, B, and C.  Only the subpoena to the service provider in district C is 
mistakenly issued.  If the geographic limitations of Rule 45 were imposed, then X would have to 
retain counsel in each of those three jurisdictions to obtain and serve the three subpoenas, which 
would be a substantial burden.  The service provider in C, however, would not be significantly 
burdened in challenging the subpoena it received in the district C court.  Essentially, in this 
217
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situation, the three subpoenas would result in a total of three substantial burdens, all falling on 
the shoulders of the copyright owner, X.  
On the other hand, if the geographic limitations of Rule 45 were not applied to DMCA 
subpoenas, then X would merely serve each of the three service providers with subpoenas issued 
from the court in X’s district.  Because the subpoenas issued to the service providers in districts 
A and B are accurate, there would be no substantial burden as a result of their compliance.220  If 
the service provider in district C were unable to convince X that the subpoena issued to it was 
invalid or mistaken, then the service provider would have to retain counsel in X’s district to 
challenge the subpoena.  Thus, under the same circumstances, the three subpoenas would only 
result in at most one substantial burden, this time falling on the shoulders of the service provider 
in district C.  
This rather lengthy example demonstrates that the RIAA’s interpretation would likely be 
more efficient in the long term when all the parties are taken into account.  This is especially true 
considering that the ratio of proper to erroneous DMCA subpoenas is likely greater than 2 to 1.  
Excluding the geographic limitations of Rule 45 would also allow for more expeditious 
enforcement of copyrights, thereby affording more protection for copyright owners.
It is not clear from the text of the DMCA or from its legislative history whether Congress 
intended such a result.221  Due to the conflicting case law raised by the two sides, this issue is 
much better resolved by Congress.  Congress could easily amend section 512(h)(6) to explicitly 
incorporate or exclude the geographical limitations of Rule 45, as it has done for other federal 
220
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statutes.222  While excluding these limitations would significantly burden service providers in the 
short term until the conflict surrounding the subpoena provision is resolved, it would likely be a 
much more efficient approach in the long run.  In addition, as will be suggested later in this 
Article, Congress could include an express provision in the DMCA requiring copyright owners 
to compensate service providers for unduly burdensome subpoenas, thereby shifting the financial 
burden at least somewhat back to the copyright owners.223
B. Constitutional Issues
In addition to the issues relating to the construction and interpretation of section 512, a 
number of constitutional challenges have been levied against the subpoena provision.  These 
challenges have centered on Article III and the First and Fifth Amendments.  Privacy advocates 
argue that the DMCA subpoena provision unconstitutionally implicates the rights to free speech 
and due process of law in addition to violating the Article III “case or controversy” 
requirement.224
1. Violation of the Article III Case or Controversy Requirement?
Article III, section 2 of the United States Constitution limits the exercise of federal 
judicial authority to situations involving “cases” or “controversies.”225  This restriction is 
generally interpreted to mean that federal courts may only resolve legal questions arising out of 
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federal statutes, thus, overriding the geographical limitations of Rule 45); Motion to Enforce Subpoena to MIT at 15 
(noting that Congress amended CERCLA to confirm that nationwide service of process was available under that 
statute).
223 See infra Part V.D.
224 See Brief of Amici Curiae in Support of Appellant Verizon Internet Services and Urging Reversal at 4, In re 
Verizon Internet Servs., Inc. Subpoena Enforcement Matter, Nos. 03-7015, 03-7053 (D.C. Cir. filed May 16, 2003) 
(consolidated appeal) [hereinafter Brief of Amici Curiae].
225 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
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actual disputes between real parties.226  In Verizon II, the ISP argued that the DMCA subpoena 
provision violates Article III because “it authorizes federal courts to issue subpoenas in the 
absence of a pending case or controversy.”227  Verizon maintained that “[a]n ex parte request for 
a subpoena duces tecum is not in itself a ‘case or controversy’ within the meaning of Article III” 
because it neither names an adverse party nor seeks any form of judicial relief or decree.228
Because “the power to issue subpoenas exists only in the context of a case that is properly 
pending before a federal court,” Verizon concluded that subpoenas issued pursuant to the DMCA 
are unenforceable under Article III.229
The court rejected each of Verizon’s contentions based on several grounds.  Initially, the 
court noted that “the clerk’s issuance of a section 512(h) subpoena does not involve either the 
exercise of judicial power or the exercise by federal judges of…investigatory power,” and thus 
could not be construed as an act of the court.230  The court pointed out that the clerk exercises no 
discretion and merely executes a ministerial duty.231  The court reasoned that the Supreme Court 
226 See Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 154-55 (1990).  In its brief in support of its motion to quash the second 
subpoena, Verizon defined “case or controversy” as an “adversarial proceeding seeking a judicial determination of 
an actual legal claim.”  Verizon Internet Services, Inc.’s Brief in Support of its Motion to Quash February 4, 2003 
Subpoena and Addressing Questions Propounded by the Court at 4, Verizon II , 257 F. Supp. 2d 244 (D.D.C. 2003) 
(1:03MS00040-JDB) [hereinafter Verizon’s Brief].
227 Verizon II, 257 F. Supp. 2d at 248.
228
 Verizon’s Brief at 9.
229 Id. at 12.  Verizon quoted the U.S. Supreme Court’s opinion in United States Catholic Conference v. Abortion 
Rights Mobilization, Inc., 487 U.S. 72 (1988):
Federal Rule Civil Procedure 45 grants a district court the power to issue subpoenas as to 
witnesses and documents, but the subpoena power of a court cannot be more extensive than its 
jurisdiction.  It follows that if a district court does not have subject-matter jurisdiction over the 
underlying action, and the process was not issued in aid of determining that jurisdiction, then the 
process is void and an order of civil contempt based on refusal to honor it must be reversed.  Id. at 
76.
230 Verizon II, 257 F. Supp. 2d at 249.
231 Id. at 249-50 (finding support for this argument in the legislative record in S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 51).
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has long “distinguished between actions that are ministerial in nature and those that constitute an 
exercise of judicial, legislative, or discretionary executive power.”232  Quoting Justice Marshall’s 
opinion in Custiss v. Georgetown & Alexandria Turnpike Co., the court stated that “the 
legislature may direct the clerk of a court to perform a specified service, without making his act 
the act of the court.”233  From a practical perspective, reasoned the court, no Article III judge 
takes any action with respect to a DMCA subpoena until the copyright owner moves to enforce it 
or the service provider moves to quash it.234  Once either of these actions occurs, an actual 
controversy exists sufficient to confer jurisdiction under Article III.235
Verizon expressly opposed this reasoning, arguing that subpoenas are issued in the name 
of the court and should be treated as acts of the court.236  In response, the court held that there is 
a distinction between subpoenas issued by express order of a judge and subpoenas issued by the 
clerk of the court.237  The court found that this distinction supported the view that the issuance of 
a subpoena by a clerk of the court is merely “a ministerial task accomplished without judicial 
involvement…”238
232 Id. at 250 (citing Custiss v. Georgetown & Alexandria Turnpike Co., 10 U.S. 233, 237 (1810)).
233 Id. (quoting Custiss, 10 U.S. at 236).
234 Id.
235 Id.
236 Verizon II, 257 F. Supp. 2d at 250.
237 Id. at 251 (finding support for this distinction in Fed. R. Civ. P. 45 and Waste Conversion, Inc. v. Rollins Envtl. 
Servs., Inc., 893 F.2d 605, 608 (3d Cir. 1990)).
238 Id.
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The court further stated that even if the issuance of a DMCA subpoena could be 
characterized as a judicial act, Verizon’s Article III challenge would still fail for two reasons.239
First, “Congress has enacted several provisions that specifically authorize the clerk of the district 
court to issue subpoenas despite the absence of a pending case or controversy in the federal 
courts.”240  Second, aside from the subpoenas authorized in these provisions, “‘federal courts and 
judges have long performed a variety of functions that…do not necessarily or directly involve 
adversarial proceedings within a trial or appellate court.”241  The court drew an analogy to Rule 
27(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which allows a court to order the deposition of a 
witness before an action is filed, where doing so would “prevent a failure or delay of justice.”242
Under both of these provisions, “private parties may avail themselves of judicial machinery to 
obtain information prior to the filing of a complaint…if they satisfy a specific set of criteria and 
identify with particularity the information they seek to compel.”243
In its supporting brief, Verizon rejected this analogy, which was indirectly raised by the 
RIAA.244  Verizon noted that Rule 27(a) requires a demonstration that the petitioner for such an 
order expects to be a party to an action that it is presently unable to bring or cause to be 
239 Id.
240 Id. (citing, among other statutes, 2 U.S.C. § 388 (2000) (“subpoenas for depositions in connection with 
proceedings in the House of Representatives”); 35 U.S.C. § 24 (2000) (“subpoenas for evidence to be used in 
connection with proceedings in Patent and Trademark Office”); 45 U.S.C. § 157(h) (“subpoenas at the request of 
arbitrators under the Railway Labor Act”)).
241 Id. at 251-52 (quoting Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 681 n.20 (1988)).  The court noted that in the criminal 
context, courts both issue warrants and review applications for surveillance, which requires judicial involvement and 
discretion in an ex parte proceeding.  Id. at 252.  Courts are also authorized “to require testimony or evidence for use 
in a foreign tribunal, even where no proceeding is yet pending in that forum.” Id.
242 Id. at 252 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 27(a)(3)).
243 Id. at 253.
244
 Verizon Brief at 14.
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brought.245  Section 512(h) contains no similar intent to file suit requirement, which makes it less 
certain that the judicial action in issuing a DMCA subpoena would relate to an actual action in 
federal court.246  Indeed, Verizon pointed out that the RIAA has expressly stated that it “merely 
wishes to contact and admonish individual subscribers it suspects of copyright infringement and 
would prefer not to file suit against them.”247  The court, however, dismissed Verizon’s argument 
on this point, stating that section 512(h)’s requirement of a sworn declaration that the 
information to be obtained will only be used for the purpose of protecting copyrights is 
sufficiently similar to the Rule 27(a) requirement as to render Verizon’s distinction between the 
two provisions inconsequential.
While Verizon’s arguments raise legitimate theoretical Article III issues with respect to 
the DMCA subpoena provision, this is likely to be an unsuccessful basis for future constitutional
challenges.  As the Verizon II court pointed out, there are a significant number of similar 
provisions in existence that have passed Article III muster.248  The strongest argument in support 
of an Article III challenge is that section 512(h) is unique in allowing “a broad category of 
private actors to obtain sensitive information from third parties, outside the context of 
litigation.”249  Such private use of the courts nearly always occurs in the context of actual or 
245 Id. at 14-15 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 27(a)(3)).
246 Id. at 15.
247 Id. (citing RIAA Reply Brief in Support of Motion to Enforce at 12-14, Verizon I, 240 F. Supp. 2d 24 (D.D.C. 
2003)).
248 Verizon II, 257 F. Supp. 2d at 251-52.
249
 Davidson, supra note 27 (emphasis in original).
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pending litigation and under the supervision of a judge.250  An argument emphasizing this point 
might be somewhat more successful than the approach taken by Verizon.
Another obstacle to the successful challenge of the DMCA subpoena provision on Article 
III grounds is the fact that there is essentially only one other solution to this problem, which is 
not entirely practical.  That solution, which Verizon raised as a possible alternative in the first 
case, would be to require copyright owners to bring “John Doe” actions before they could 
subpoena alleged infringers’ subscriber information.251  This approach would require copyright 
owners to file anonymous lawsuits before they would be able to discover alleged infringers’ 
identities.252  The court rejected this possible approach to the Article III problem on the grounds 
that there was no support for it either in the text or the legislative history of the DMCA.253  The 
court held that requiring such a procedure would defeat the major purpose of the statute, which is 
the expeditious protection of copyrights.254  In addition, the court found that such a procedure 
would be unduly burdensome on copyright owners and would not necessarily be any more 
protective of the rights of alleged infringers.255
Although the DC Circuit never reached this constitutional issue on appeal, its decision to 
disallow section 512(h) subpoenas in situations where the service provider is merely a passive 
conduit for the transmission of infringing materials has effectively forced copyright holders to 
begin bringing John Doe suits.  Since the Court of Appeals rendered its decision in December 
250 Id.
251 Verizon I, 240 F. Supp. 2d at 39.
252 Id.
253 Id. at 40.
254 Id. (holding that such a procedure would result in delays that would be at odds with Congress’s design for the 
DMCA).
255 Id. at 40-41.
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2003, the RIAA has ceased issuing section 512(h) subpoenas.256  Determined to continue 
enforcing their rights under the law, copyright holders have resorted to bringing suits against 
anonymous infringers and using traditional subpoenas to discover offenders’ identities within the 
context of litigation.257
Due to the extremely rapid nature in which copyrighted songs are illegally disseminated 
on P2P networks, John Doe suits are not an appropriate remedy for copyright holders.  Forcing a 
copyright holder to engage in costly and time-consuming litigation while the defendants continue 
to anonymously share infringing materials with millions of other individuals is distinctly unfair 
and contrary to Congressional intent.  As the Verizon I court pointed out, Congress intended for 
copyright holders to have an efficient and expeditious tool for uncovering and halting 
infringement, which John Doe suits are not.258  As will be discussed shortly, a subpoena process 
with built-in statutory protections would afford copyright owners with a remedy much more 
suited to the problem posed by P2P networks while providing adequate protection for the rights 
of alleged infringers.  Ironically, offenders currently facing John Doe lawsuits would likely 
prefer the section 512(h) subpoena process, which typically resulted in minimal settlements with 
copyright holders, to full-blown lawsuits, which will no doubt result in much stiffer penalties.
It remains to be seen how other jurisdictions will rule on whether DMCA subpoenas 
violate Article III.  Although the issue is moot with respect to subpoenas issued in the District of 
Columbia for the identities of P2P file sharers, it remains an open question in the remaining 
eleven circuits where DMCA subpoenas issued based on infringement falling under section 
256 RIAA Subpoenas Halted, Electronic Frontier Foundation (Dec. 1, 2003), at
http://www.eff.org/IP/P2P/riaasubpoenas/ (last visited Feb. 17, 2004).
257 Id. (noting that the RIAA has filed John Doe suits against 532 unidentified alleged infringers).
258 Verizon I, 240 F. Supp. 2d at 40.
55
512(a) are still valid.  Even if the other jurisdictions follow the lead of the DC Circuit in 
disallowing section 512(h) subpoenas in situations where the service provider is merely a passive 
conduit for the transmission of infringing materials, subpoenas issued in cases governed by 
subsections (b) through (d) may still violate Article III.  However, because there is analogous 
precedent for subsection 512(h) and because there are no truly viable alternatives, Article III 
challenges to the DMCA subpoena provision will likely continue to be unsuccessful.259
2. Violations of the First Amendment Right to Free Speech and the Fifth 
Amendment Guarantee of Federal Due Process?
Verizon, backed by a veritable throng of amici curiae supporters, also challenged the 
DMCA subpoena provision on First and Fifth Amendment grounds in the second Verizon 
case.260  Verizon contended that the statute provides insufficient procedural protection against 
the subpoena provision’s intrusion on the right to free anonymous speech.261  Verizon argued 
that, as interpreted by the RIAA and the Verizon I court, the subpoena provision is “vastly overly 
broad” and should be held invalid.262
Discussing a line of recent decisions, Verizon noted that the U.S. Supreme Court has 
“repeatedly recognized that individuals have a right to speak, listen, and associate anonymously” 
259
 Pacific Bell Internet Services has raised essentially the same Article III issue in its declaratory action against the 
RIAA and other copyright owners pending in the Northern District of California.  Pacific Bell Internet Servs. v. 
Recording Indus. Ass’n of America, No. C 03-3560 SI (N.D. Cal. filed July 30, 2003).  A conflicting opinion would 
not be altogether surprising from the Ninth Circuit, which is commonly in disagreement with other jurisdictions.
260 Verizon II, 257 F. Supp. 2d at 257.
261
 Verizon Brief at 19.  Verizon’s argument combines the First and Fifth Amendment issues.  Essentially, the 
subpoena provision deprives alleged infringers of their First Amendment right to free, anonymous speech without 
affording them the due process of law guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment. Id.
262 Id.
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in numerous situations.263  Such free and anonymous expression extends to the context of the 
Internet.264  Verizon acknowledged that “there is no First Amendment right to engage in 
copyright infringement.”265  However, Verizon argued, the subpoena provision has the power to 
strip away a user’s right to anonymity in other contexts.266  In addition, section 512(h) does not 
include any “built-in safeguards” against the curtailment of free, anonymous speech in these 
other contexts.267  Essentially, Verizon argued that although there is no right to free, anonymous 
speech in the infringement of copyrights, there is a right to free, anonymous speech in other 
legitimate online activities, and, in uncovering the identity of a user to establish infringement, the 
DMCA subpoena provision deprives an alleged infringer of the right to speak anonymously in 
any context.  Without sufficient statutory safeguards to protect against the improper or mistaken 
revelation of a subscriber’s identity, the subpoena provision is unconstitutionally broad.  In 
depriving an individual of such a fundamental right, the subpoena provision merely requires “an 
ex parte ‘good faith’ allegation by anyone willing to allege he or she is a copyright owner, or 
authorized to act on behalf of a copyright owner, and that copyright infringement might be 
occurring.”268  Such measures are not enough to protect the right of free, anonymous speech, 
Verizon argued.  Verizon noted that the lack of an adversarial process was the primary 
263 Id. at 19-20 (citing Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of N.Y., Inc. v. Village of Stratton, 122 S. Ct. 2080, 2089 
(2002); Buckley v. American Constitutional law Found., Inc., 525 U.S. 182, 200, 204 (1999); McIntyre v. Ohio 
Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 342 (1995)).
264 Id. at 20 (citing Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997)).
265 Id. at 24.
266 Id. at 24-25.
267 Id. at 25.
268 Id. (citing § 512(c)(3)(A)(v)).
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deficiency in the DMCA subpoena provision.269  This deficiency “will inevitably lead to both 
honest mistakes and deliberate abuse—thereby stripping Internet users of anonymity even where 
the underlying speech and association is fully protected.”270  In support of its argument, Verizon 
cited an instance of mistake that had already occurred, which will be discussed later in this 
Article in conjunction with an assortment of other mistakes and abuses that have occurred 
recently under the authority of section 512(h).271
Not surprisingly, considering its holding in Verizon I, the Verizon II court rejected these 
First and Fifth Amendment arguments and upheld the constitutionality of the DMCA subpoena 
provision.272  As a preliminary matter, the court acknowledged that Verizon had standing to 
assert these constitutional challenges on behalf of its subscribers.273  The court also 
acknowledged that the Supreme Court has recognized a right of anonymity within the First 
Amendment and that the protections of that right extend to expression on the Internet.274  In 
addition, the court noted that there are some limitations on subpoena power “when its invocation 
affects First Amendment rights involving anonymity.”275  The court found it significant, 
however, that the U.S. Supreme Court’s holdings that the First Amendment protects anonymity 
have been rendered in the context of cases involving “core” First Amendment expression, such 
269 Id. at 26.
270 Id.
271 Id. at 27; see infra notes 288-91 and accompanying text.
272 Verizon II, 257 F. Supp. 2d at 257.  In Verizon I, Judge Bates informally addressed the First Amendment issue, 
concluding that it was unlikely that the DMCA subpoena provision violated the right to free speech in an 
unconstitutional manner.  Verizon I, 240 F. Supp. 2d at 42-44.
273 Verizon II, 257 F. Supp. 2d at 258.
274 Id. at 258-59 (citing Buckley, 525 U.S. at 200; Reno, 521 U.S. at 870).
275 Id. at 259, n.17.
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as religious or political speech.276  The court found that the DMCA subpoena power “does not 
directly impact core political speech, and thus may not warrant the type of ‘exacting scrutiny’ 
reserved for that context.”277  The court concluded that although some First Amendment 
protection should be afforded to anonymous expression on the Internet, the degree of that 
protection “is minimal where alleged copyright infringement is the expression at issue.”278
In addition, the court found that section 512(h) affords alleged infringers sufficient 
procedural safeguards to protect their First Amendment rights.279  The court pointed to the fact 
that to obtain a section 512(h) subpoena, one must provide: (1) a statement that the use of 
copyrighted material is not authorized by the owner and that the information in the notification is 
accurate,280 (2) a sworn declaration to the effect that the purpose for which the subpoena is 
sought is to obtain the identity of an alleged infringer and that such information will only be used 
for the purpose of protecting copyrights,281 and (3) a statement, made under penalty of perjury, 
that the complaining party is authorized to act on behalf of the owner of the infringed 
copyright.282  Also, § 512(f) further discourages the abuse of subpoenas by providing for a cause
of action against anyone who “knowingly materially misrepresents” that activity is infringing.283
276 Id. at 259-60 (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957), “The First Amendment affords the 
broadest protection to such political expression in order ‘to assure [the] unfettered interchange of ideas for the 
bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people.’”).
277 Id. at 260 (citing McIntyre v. Ohio Election Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 347 (1995)).
278 Verizon II, 257 F. Supp. 2d at 260.
279 Id. at 262.
280 Id. (citing § 512(c)(3)(A)(v)).
281 Id. (citing § 512(h)(2)(C)).
282 Id. (citing § 512(c)(3)(A)(vi)).
283 Id. at 263 (citing § 512(f)).
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Holding that these procedural safeguards sufficiently protect alleged infringers against baseless 
or abusive subpoenas, the court concluded that “it is unlikely that section 512(h) will require 
disclosure, to any significant degree, of the identity of individuals engaged in protected 
anonymous speech, as opposed to those engaged in unprotected copyright infringement.”284
Finally, despite acknowledging that section 512(h) will impact some protected expression 
and that the provision could be used to mistakenly pursue and obtain the identity of an innocent 
user, Judge Bates concluded that section 512(h) is not so “substantially” overbroad that it may be 
invalidated on its face.285  He found it significant that Verizon never introduced evidence of 
abuse or mistake in the use of the DMCA subpoena provision during the five years since its 
enactment.
Unfortunately, Judge Bates’s opinion in Verizon II contains several major holes and he 
ignored important practical considerations regarding the DMCA’s operation.  First, “all these 
protections” cited by Judge Bates are not necessarily sufficient to protect the First Amendment 
rights of alleged infringers.  He listed three requirements for obtaining a subpoena pursuant to 
the DMCA; however, each of these three requirements depends solely on the conscience of the 
party attempting to obtain the subpoena.  Two of them merely demand statements made in good 
faith.  Although the third requirement demands a statement made under penalty of perjury, the 
slim chance that a U.S. Attorney will choose to prosecute such an offense is likely to have very 
little deterrent effect.286  There is no step in the subpoena provision that allows for independent 
verification of the statements made by the party seeking the subpoena before it is issued.
284 Id.
285 Id. at 264 (“[T]he overbreadth of a statute must not only be real, but substantial as well.”); Ashcroft v. ACLU, 
535 U.S. 564, 584 (2002) (“Only a statute that is substantially overbroad may be invalidated on its face.”).
286 See Davidson, supra note 27.
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Additionally, each of these safeguards listed by Judge Bates only protects against the 
abuse of the DMCA subpoena power.  They do nothing to prevent the release of identification 
information in response to a subpoena issued based on a mistake made in good faith.  Section 
512 supplies a procedure for challenging mistaken takedown notices;287 such a procedure is even 
more crucial in the subpoena context because identification information cannot be unlearned or 
returned once it is received.  An appropriate challenging mechanism would not involve anything 
as burdensome as a full evidentiary hearing, but would only require that some minimal 
independent assessment of the validity of the subpoena request be made, possibly by the service 
provider or the clerk of the issuing court.
A second flaw in Judge Bates’s opinion lies in his disregard for the substantial potential 
for overbreadth posed by the DMCA subpoena provision.  Not finding any evidence of abuse or 
mistakes in the subpoena provision’s short history, he essentially concluded that such a risk is 
minimal.288  There have occurred already, however, instances of mistakenly issued subpoenas 
and subpoena responses.289  For example, MIT finally released to the RIAA the name and 
information of a student with whom it associated the IP address listed on the subpoena issued by 
the RIAA.  “Despite having been out of the country at the time of the alleged infringement and 
declaring that he did not even own a computer, the student was unable to prevent release of his 
name and identifying information.”290  In another case, “seven record labels mistakenly sued a 
287
 17 U.S.C. § 512(g) (2000).
288 Verizon II, 257 F. Supp.2d at 265.
289
 Unsafe Harbors: Abusive DMCA Subpoenas and Takedown Demands, Electronic Frontier Foundation (Oct. 7, 
2003), (citing Keith J. Winstein, MIT Names Student as Alleged Infringer, The Tech (Sept. 9, 2003); Chris Gaither, 
Recording Industry Withdraws Suit, Boston Globe, Sept. 24, 2003), at
http://www.eff.org/IP/P2P/20030926_unsafe_harbors.php (last visited Feb. 17, 2004).
290 Id.
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65-year-old Massachusetts woman for copyright infringement…based only on KaAaA 
screenshots and Comcast’s disclosure of her name and address in response to a subpoena.”291
The woman, however, only used a Macintosh computer, which cannot support the KaZaA 
program.292  Clearly, contrary to Judge Bates’s opinion, mistakes have occurred and will 
continue to occur as long as the subpoena provision operates as it currently stands, thus, resulting 
in the improper deprivation of First Amendment rights.
Judge Bates’s reasoning also ignores the fact that the subpoena provision has experienced 
extremely limited use until very recently.  Copyright owners have primarily utilized the 
takedown notification process throughout most of the DMCA’s short life.293  These takedown 
notifications have achieved notoriety for their frequent mistakes and often frivolous and 
harassing nature.  A glance at the Electronic Frontier Foundation’s website confirms that this 
reputation is indeed deserved.294  It contains multiple documented instances of takedown 
notifications issued mistakenly or for purposes of harassment.295  The takedown provisions 
contain even more safeguards than the subpoena provision, yet it is still vulnerable to frequent 
mistakes and misuse.  Evidently, the safeguards that Judge Bates listed in his opinion are not 
sufficient to protect the subpoena provision from infringing on users’ First Amendment rights in 
an overbroad manner.  Section 512 is in dire need of additional procedural safeguards that would 
291 Id.
292 Id.
293 See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
294 Unsafe Harbors: Abusive DMCA Subpoenas and Takedown Demands, Electronic Frontier Foundation, at
http://www.eff.org/IP/P2P/20030926_unsafe_harbors.php (last visited Feb. 17, 2004).
295 Id.  “The RIAA recently admitted to several dozen additional errors in sending accusatory DMCA notices—all 
made in a single week.”  Id. (citing McCullagh, supra note 111).
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protect users from erroneous identification without unduly burdening copyright owners in their 
quest to pursue and put an end to infringement.
C. Practical Policy Issues: The Subpoena Provision’s Negative Potential
In addition to these constitutional and statutory issues that have been propounded with 
respect to the DMCA subpoena provision, various practical concerns have been raised regarding 
its application.  Privacy advocates are quick to note the number of erroneous takedown 
notifications and subpoenas that have been issued under the DMCA.296  Descriptions of worst-
case scenarios that could arise as a result of abuse of the subpoena provision abound.  However, 
even a well-functioning subpoena process would inherently possess some potential for mistakes 
and abuses.  A well-functioning subpoena process could also impose significant burdens, both 
legally and administratively, on all the parties involved, especially in the event that a large 
number of subpoenas are issued.  Several questions arise in connection with the management of 
these negative consequences, but only two will be discussed in this Article.  First, who should 
bear the burden of responding to masses of subpoenas? Also, who should bear the burden of 
discovering and compensating for the mistakes and abuses that will inevitably occur?
1. Undue Response Burden
In answer to the first question, it may be more appropriate and efficient to shift at least 
some of the burden of responding to the potential flood of DMCA subpoenas back to the 
copyright owners.  In the current battle against copyright infringement, there are many copyright 
owners from a broad range of backgrounds pursuing a host of online copyright infringers.297  The 
296 Id.
297 Id. (“In 2002, Pacific Bell Internet Services and its affiliates were given more than 16,700 DMCA notices by 
RIAA agent MediaForce; in July 2003, RIAA attempted to serve more than 200 subpoenas through various affiliated 
entities.  Titan Media, a purveyor of pornographic materials, sent a single subpoena demanding identities of alleged 
infringers at 59 different dynamically assigned IP addresses, then dropped the subpoena when Pacific Bell 
announced its intent to challenge its enforcement.”).  In addition to members of the recording and motion picture 
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incredibly large number of parties involved could result in a landslide of subpoenas that would 
overrun smaller ISPs.298  It takes a service provider employee approximately 20 minutes to 
research and respond to a subpoena request.299  Multiplying this time expenditure by the 
thousands of potential subpoenas—not simply from the music recording industry, but also from 
many other types of copyright owners—results in significant potential expense for service 
providers.  Not only would the administrative burden of responding to each subpoena be 
overwhelming, but the potential legal burden stemming from fighting a subpoena or defending 
an action for improper release of identification information could also be enormous.  Smaller 
service providers generally have minimal administrative staffing and no legal department.  The 
burden that would be caused by a flood of subpoenas would crush many of these smaller ISPs 
out of existence.
The problem with the current process is that there are no limiting factors that would 
provide some control over the number of subpoenas that are issued.  First, the identification of 
infringers and the request for subpoenas is an almost completely automated process for copyright 
owners, which means that they bear little burden or cost at the front end that would limit the 
number of subpoenas requested.300  Second, there are no requirements on what a copyright owner 
industries, software distributors and a host of independent writers and artists have utilized the DMCA, whether 
wrong or right, to protect their copyrights.
298 District of Columbia Court Lacks Authority to Issue DMCA Subpoenas to Boston Schools, 66 ELECTRONIC COM. 
& L. REP. No. 1634, at 459 (Aug. 15, 2003); Issues Arising out of RIAA v. Verizon, Electronic Privacy Information 
Center (Dec. 19, 2003) (noting the general concern “that as copyright holders chase after hundreds or even 
thousands of peer-to-peer users using automated copyright infringement monitors, such as Ranger Inc., it will result 
in huge costs for the ISPs faced with processing the requests”), at http://www.epic.org/privacy/copyright/verizon/ 
(last visited Feb. 17, 2004).
299
 Bob Liu, Copyrights: More Work, More Headaches, Internet.com (March 12, 2003) (noting that a network 
administrator at a university with only 5,500 students requires 15 to 30 minutes to find the source of the copyright 
infringement upon receiving a complaint), at http://isp-planet.com/perspectives/2003/bliu.html (last visited Feb. 17, 
2004).
300 See Manjoo, supra note 37 (quoting Peter Swire, law professor at Ohio State University).
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must do once he has obtained an alleged infringer’s identification information.301  Requiring a 
copyright owner to pursue an action or to at least further investigate the matter would ensure that 
the copyright owner only requests subpoenas in situations where infringement is at least 
somewhat certain.   Because there is no such requirement that any kind of legal or investigative 
action be taken, there are no practical limitations at the tail end of the process either.  Finally, 
there is no provision for shifting the cost of improperly issued subpoenas back to copyright 
owners.  Such a provision would decrease the number of mistakenly issued subpoenas by 
providing copyright owners with incentive to request subpoenas only in situations where they are 
fairly certain that infringement is indeed occurring.
Essentially, the current process unfairly distributes the entire burden of responding to 
subpoenas to ISPs in a manner that is contrary to the legislature’s intent in enacting section 512.  
While Congress intended to make the enforcement process as fast and efficient as possible for 
copyright owners,302 this goal is not sacrificed by forcing copyright owners to bear some of the 
administrative costs that responding to subpoenas imposes.  Especially in the event of mistakenly 
issued subpoenas, over which service providers have no control, such a burden shifting scheme 
would seem appropriate and much more efficient.  It must be remembered that the other primary 
goal of section 512 is to clarify and limit the liability of service providers for their subscribers’ 
infringement.303  From a monetary perspective, the burden of responding to a flood of subpoena 
requests could serve as much of a penalty as would a finding of liability for infringement, thus 
defeating one of the major goals of the DMCA.  Congress made it clear that section 512 was 
301 See Davidson, supra note 27.
302 Verizon I, 240 F. Supp. 2d at 35 (citing S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 8).
303 S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 19-20
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intended to foster cooperation between service providers and copyright owners in the fight 
against infringement.304  Such legislative intent should not be arbitrarily limited to exclude 
financial cooperation.
2. Undue Burden of Identifying and Correcting Erroneous Subpoenas
Similarly, the entire burden of discovering abusive and erroneous DMCA subpoenas also 
falls squarely on the shoulder of ISPs and their subscribers.  The RIAA claims that it individually 
checks each subpoena request before it is sent to the clerk of the court, but obviously mistakes 
slip past their inspection process.305  The burden of catching these missed mistakes subsequently 
falls on the service providers.  If the service provider chooses not to respond to an erroneously 
issued subpoena, it must move to quash it in court and bears the cost for doing so.  If the service 
provider simply responds to the erroneous subpoena, as the DMCA requires, the service provider 
may open itself up to potential liability.306  In either event, the service provider bears the burden 
of not only discovering the copyright owner’s mistake, but also correcting it.  This inequitable 
result could be remedied with the incorporation of a provision in section 512 that requires 
copyright owners to compensate service providers for any costs associated with challenging 
erroneously issued subpoenas.
By no means does this Article purport to discuss every issue that has been raised with 
respect to the DMCA subpoena provision, but these represent most of the more compelling 
304 S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 20.
305 See Lyman, supra note 31 (outlining the RIAA’s approach to uncovering infringers); Manjoo, supra note 37 
(quoting Cindy Cohn, legal director of the Electronic Frontier Foundation, “The ISPs get thousands of these things, 
and they get a not insignificant percent that are not just wrong, but are spectacularly wrong.  And if the Verizon 
decision under 512(h) is upheld, we’ll start seeing the same thing for people’s identities, and they’re going to be 
wrong in the same percentage that they’re wrong now.”).
306
 Nothing in section 512 appears to protect the service provider in this situation since section 512(f)(1) seems only 
to apply to incorrect takedowns, not subpoena responses.
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challenges.  Next, Part V proposes various changes that could be introduced to section 512, 
which would alleviate many of these problems.
V. PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE DMCA SUBPOENA PROVISION
The fact that so many challenges have been levied against the DMCA subpoena provision 
and so many practical issues have been raised with respect to its application makes it 
exceedingly clear that the subpoena provision, in its current state, is significantly flawed.  These 
flaws were not a major concern until recently, when they became magnified as a result of 
copyright owners’ sharply increased utilization of the provision.  Rather than simply discarding 
the subpoena provision, however, a better approach would be to augment it with additional 
procedural privacy protections.  
A. Subscriber Notice
The issuance of formal notification to subscribers before their identity is revealed would 
provide them with warning and would allow them to contest wrongfully issued subpoenas.  Such 
notice would come from the service provider and would likely arrive in the form of an e-mail to 
streamline the process as much as possible.  Several state statutes require that service providers 
afford notice to an anonymous subscriber at least a certain period of time before they may release 
the subscriber’s identity to the subpoenaing party.307  A notice requirement would preserve the 
307 See e.g., VA. CODE § 8.01-407.1 (2000).
“Except where the anonymous communicator has consented to disclosure in advance, within five 
business days after receipt of a subpoena and supporting materials calling for disclosure of 
identifying information concerning an anonymous communicator, the individual or entity to whom 
the subpoena is addressed shall (i) send an electronic mail notification to the anonymous 
communicator reporting that the subpoena has been received if an e-mail address is available and 
(ii) dispatch one copy thereof, by registered mail or commercial delivery service, return receipt 
requested, to the anonymous communicator at his last known address, if any is on file with the 
person to whom the subpoena is addressed.”
Id. § 8.01-407.1(A)(3).
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due process rights of Internet users and would also act as a deterrence to abusive subpoena 
requests.308  Such notice would also increase the public’s awareness of the legal actions that 
copyright owners are bringing against infringers, which would result in a further deterrent 
effect.309  Finally, the provision of notice to subscribers would not disrupt the investigation or 
enforcement process because the copyright owners would already have sufficient evidence of the 
infringement by the time the user is informed of the subpoena.310
While the requirement of such notice would cost copyright holders precious time, the 
subpoena could be served in conjunction with a takedown notification to the service provider or 
the subscriber, depending on where the infringing materials are located.311  Such a measure 
would prevent any infringing material from being made available to other users while the 
enforcement is pending.  In the case of infringing files located directly on the alleged infringer’s 
computer, the suspect would be warned to disable online access to them.  If the suspect refused 
to cooperate, his or her service could be terminated until the issue is resolved.
B. Restrictions on Retention and Use of Subpoenaed Information
To some extent, section 512 purports to restrict the manner in which subscriber identity 
information can be used.312  Such restrictions, however, could be more explicitly clarified, and a 
specific limit could be placed on the time period for which identity information could be 
308 See Davidson, supra note 27.
309 Id.
310 Id.
311
 As noted by the DC Circuit in Verizon, because service providers do not have control over the infringing material 
being shared over P2P networks, such a situation would require the takedown notification to be issued directly to the 
offender.  Such action would obviously require a change in the current law, which has no such provision.
312
 The subpoena provision requires “a sworn declaration to the effect that the purpose for which the subpoena is 
sought is to obtain the identity of an alleged infringer and that such information will only be used for the purpose of 
protecting rights under this title.”  § 512(h)(2)(C).  There are no built-in penalties for a violation of this requirement 
other than the possibility of prosecution for perjury, which is not necessarily the strongest deterrent.
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retained.313  Such a time limit would most appropriately be based on whether or not legal action 
is taken against the alleged infringer.  For example, such a scheme could require that the 
information be erased within a period of 6 months after it is obtained if no suit is filed within that 
time.  Otherwise, the information would have to be erased within a period of 6 months after the 
settlement or conclusion of a lawsuit and any resulting appeal.
These restrictions on content and duration would not hinder copyright owners using the 
subpoena process for legitimate enforcement purposes, but would go a long way to prevent 
identity information from being misused.  Identity and contact information, especially in mass 
quantities, is extremely valuable today for advertising purposes.  It is not inconceivable that a 
less than scrupulous copyright holder might sell a list of such information to an advertising 
agency or online business.  Additionally, copyright holders could organize subpoenaed identity 
information to create infringer blacklists.314  Those winding up on such a blacklist could find 
their names posted online or find themselves restricted from legitimately purchasing digital 
music recordings online.  Specific restrictions on how copyright holders may use subpoenaed 
identity information and substantial penalties for their violation would ensure that such 
information is only used for the enforcement of copyrights and would help to alleviate legitimate 
public concern.
C. Private Right of Action for Abuse of Subpoena Process
Congress attempted to provide for penalties for abuse relating to section 512,315 but 
further penalties are necessary to cover the broader range of situations that may currently arise in 
313 See Davidson, supra note 27.
314 Id.
315 See e.g., § 512(f) (providing for the recovery of damages, including costs and attorneys’ fees, incurred as a result 
of misrepresentation as to the infringing nature of material).
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the context of copyright enforcement.  In addition to providing a right of action against those 
materially misrepresenting infringement, such liability should also extend to service providers 
who do not provide notice to their subscribers and to copyright owners who misuse identification 
information.  At least one state, California, has already begun considering similar legislation.316
An extension of the penalties already provided for in section 512 would not burden parties using 
the subpoena authority for legitimate copyright enforcement, but would provide Internet users 
with recourse against abuses of the system.
Holding a service provider liable for failure to give notice to a subscriber that his or her 
identity has been subpoenaed places the burden of ensuring due process for the subscriber on the 
service provider.  While this may seem somewhat harsh since the service provider is technically 
not even involved in the dispute, there is no other way to guarantee that the subscriber receives 
notice of the pending subpoena.  The service provider is the only link between the copyright 
holder and the alleged infringer.  As a result, there must be consequences for the failure to carry 
out the simple yet important task of conveying notice of a subpoena to the allegedly infringing 
subscriber.
D. Cost Reimbursement
Currently, the burden of responding to DMCA subpoenas falls entirely on ISPs.  Shifting 
at least a portion of this burden back to copyright owners would not be inconsistent with the 
legislative intent behind section 512.317  Requiring copyright owners to reimburse at least some 
of the costs associated with responding to subpoenas is also consistent with Rule 45 of the 
316
 Internet Communications Protection Act of 2003, Cal. AB 1143 (2003).
317 See supra note 302 and accompanying text.
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Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the subpoena provisions of several other federal statutes.318
As discussed above, these costs have the potential to be significant, especially for smaller service 
providers.  Section 512 currently does not provide any incentive, either negative or positive, to 
copyright holders to minimize these costs by ensuring the accuracy and appropriateness of their 
subpoena requests.
One reason for not statutorily shifting a portion of the subpoena response costs back to 
the copyright holders would be that service providers indirectly benefit, in the form of monthly 
service fees, from their subscribers’ infringement.  This logic falls apart to some extent, however, 
considering that most subscribers to Internet service would continue to use the Internet for other 
purposes regardless of their ability to download copyrighted material.  Service providers do not 
receive any more or less benefit based on the type of online activity in which their subscribers 
engage.
On the other hand, the creation of some type of reimbursement scheme would likely 
reduce the number of frivolous, abusive, and erroneous subpoenas, thus rendering the entire 
process more efficient.  If copyright holders knew that they would be subject to statutory fees or 
penalties for serving erroneous subpoenas or to liability for serving abusive or frivolous 
subpoenas, the issuance of an improper subpoena would likely be a much rarer occurrence.  
Statutorily shifting the cost of subpoenas in such cases would balance the burden of ensuring the 
accuracy of all subpoenas more evenly between service providers and copyright holders.
E. Reporting Requirement
One of the problems with section 512(h), which has resulted in significant public outcry 
against the DMCA, is that the public has little idea how often and for what purposes the 
318 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(c); 15 U.S.C. § 49 (2000) (Federal Trade Commission Act).
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subpoena provision is being used.319  An amendment to section 512(h) requiring an annual report 
to Congress on the number of subpoenas requested and granted and for what types of 
copyrighted material would provide the legislature with information that could be used to 
monitor for abuses and further streamline the subpoena process.320  Such a requirement would 
also greatly allay the public’s fear because much of that fear is of the unknown, rather than the 
subpoena process itself.
F. Putting it all Together
In a rather disjunctive fashion, this Article recommends a number of possible 
improvements to the DMCA subpoena provision.  In concluding this discussion, it would likely 
be helpful to the reader to visualize how each of these improvements would work together to 
strengthen protection for the interests of both copyright holders and Internet users.  The 
following hypothetical should assist the reader in this exercise.
Take the case of Bart and James, best friends and next door neighbors.  Bart often uses 
his family’s computer to illegally download copyrighted music files from a P2P program called 
SongsRus.  Because James’s parents have warned him not to download copyrighted music on 
their computer, he gets his daily dose of illegal audio entertainment at Bart’s house.  James,
being an aspiring artist, has also drawn renderings of scenes from two recent motion pictures, 
which he saved on his computer in files titled after the movies.  Not surprisingly, the local ISP, 
SpeedyCom, is subsequently served with subpoenas for the identities of both Bart and James by 
A1 Records and Big Hitz Entertainment, respectively.
319 See Davidson, supra note 27.
320 Id.
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Assuming that these two subpoenas were not issued from a court in the DC circuit, under 
the current law, SpeedyCom would likely respond immediately to the subpoena pursuant to 
section 512(h), releasing both Bart’s and James’s identities (or their parents’).  Unless 
SpeedyCom subsequently notified the families of the subpoenas and the release of their 
identities, neither family would even be aware of any trouble until contacted by the copyright 
holders or served with citation.  Of course, the mistake made in James’s case would be quickly 
discovered, but still too late to undo the release of his family’s identity.
The proposals outlined in this Article, however, would require SpeedyCom to notify both 
Bart’s and James’s families before releasing their subscriber information.  If SpeedyCom did not 
comply with this requirement, it would be liable to both families for damages and/or a statutory 
penalty.321  Upon notification, each family would have the opportunity to present evidence to 
SpeedyCom as to why the subpoenas should not be answered.  In James’s case, SpeedyCom 
would simply pass this evidence onto Big Hitz Entertainment, and the mistake would be easily 
resolved.  Big Hitz could be required to pay a statutory fee to SpeedyCom for the cost of 
handling the mistaken subpoena issuance.  If, for some reason, Big Hitz still insisted that 
SpeedyCom respond to the subpoena, SpeedyCom could file a motion to quash in the court from 
which the subpoena was issued.  Upon the court’s granting of this motion, Big Hitz would be 
forced to reimburse SpeedyCom for the additional expense of protecting its subscriber.
In Bart’s case, it is unlikely that evidence could be supplied to SpeedyCom as to why A1 
Record’s subpoena should not be answered.  If Bart’s family never responded with any such 
evidence or, upon evaluation of the evidence submitted, SpeedyCom determined that copyright 
infringement had indeed occurred, it would release the appropriate identifying information to A1 
321
 Of course, damages would be much less, possibly even non-existent, in Bart’s case due to the fact that he was in 
fact guilty of copyright violation.
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Records and notify Bart’s family accordingly.  If SpeedyCom found some evidence suggesting 
that Bart had not engaged in copyright violation, it could again bring a motion to quash in the 
court from which the subpoena was issued.  Upon the court’s denial of this motion, SpeedyCom 
would be forced to reimburse A1 Records for the expense of enforcing the subpoena.  
Suppose that Bart’s family settles the dispute with A1 Records, but months later, A1 
Records discovers that it can recoup some of the profits it has lost over the years to copyright 
infringement by selling all the identity information it has collected via DMCA subpoenas to an 
advertising or data collection agency.  A1 Records feels that the annoying spam and sales calls 
that past infringers would receive after the sale of their information would serve them right.  As 
it currently stands, section 512 does not provide recourse for Bart’s family in this situation or 
penalties to be assessed against A1 Records for abuse of the subpoena process.  If the proposals 
in this Article were implemented, Bart’s family would have a private right of action against A1 
Records.  Such an action would be for the recovery of a statutory penalty, which would vary 
depending on the severity of the abuse.  
This hypothetical situation highlights the major procedural shortcomings in the DMCA 
subpoena process and outlines a more equitable cost-balancing scheme, which would shift some 
of the burden of dealing with these subpoenas back to the copyright holders.  This hypothetical 
also demonstrates the significant impact that implementing these relatively simple changes in the 
law would have.
VI. CONCLUSION
As the old saying goes, “If it ain’t broke, don’t fix it.”  Well, the DMCA subpoena 
provision is clearly “broke” and clearly requires fixing.  Section 512(h) provides a very useful 
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and very necessary tool for copyright owners to combat online copyright infringement.  Without 
such a provision, copyright owners would have no recourse against the actual perpetrators of 
infringement.  Without there being any way for copyright owners to identify potential infringers, 
Internet users could continue engaging in copyright violation with impunity, hidden behind an 
impenetrable veil of anonymity.  As it currently exists, however, section 512(h) threatens to tear 
down the entire curtain, exposing the identities of many innocent subscribers and depriving them 
of their fundamental Constitutional rights.  This is an unacceptable result, even in the context of
copyright enforcement.  Section 512 could easily be amended to include the various procedural 
safeguards discussed above, which would protect the rights of individual users and alleviate the 
potential burden on ISPs, while continuing to afford copyright owners with an effective and 
expeditious mechanism for pursuing infringers.
Additionally, although enacted fewer than six years ago, section 512 is already in need of 
updating to bring it in line with current technology.  In restructuring or redrafting the DMCA, 
Congress should give serious thought to simplifying section 512.  In its current state, it is unduly 
specific and complicated, and thus does not afford copyright holders protection from the most 
serious form of infringement presently taking place.  Legislation cannot anticipate tomorrow’s 
technology today, but in simplifying section 512, Congress could make it much more likely that 
future forms of copyright infringement are covered under the next version of the DMCA.
As it currently stands, section 512 does not adequately protect the interests of copyright 
holders or Internet users.  Rather than forcing the courts to legislate from their benches or 
allowing conflicting case law to sprout up across the country, Congress must act quickly to 
resolve the issues that have been raised with respect to the DMCA subpoena provision before too 
much damage is done.  Unfortunately, while several legislators have raised outspoken challenges 
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to the provision, Congress appears deadlocked on how best to resolve these complicated issues.  
Thus, it may be some time before section 512 sees any substantive changes.  Hopefully, the 
recent Verizon opinion will provide the impetus necessary to spur Congress to a speedier 
resolution.  In the meantime, copyright infringement may decline, but so will the protection of 
copyrights and Internet users’ fundamental constitutional rights.
